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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-UNITED STATES v. EVANS: DIS­
TRICT OF ARREST OR DISTRICT OF PROSECUTION?-DETERMINING 
THE PROPER TRIBUNAL FOR REVIEW OF PRETRIAL BAIL DECI­
SIONS IN THE MULTI-DISTRICT CONTEXT 
American criminal procedure has its defects, though its essentials 
have behind them the vindication of long history. But all systems 
of law, however wise, are administered through men and there­
fore may occasionally disclose the frailties of men. Perfection 
may not be demanded of law, but the capacity to counteract inev­
itable, though rare, frailties is the mark of a civilized legal 
mechanism.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Evans,2 the defendant, John Byrnes Evans, 
was arrested in Arizona on a warrant issued upon the return of an 
indictment arising out of violations of federal law alleged to have 
occurred in West Virginia.3 He was brought before the federal 
magistrate judge in Arizona,4 and ordered detained without bail 
pending trial.s Evans sought review of his detention in the United 
States District Court for the District of Arizona pursuant to the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984.6 Section 3145(b) of the Bail Reform Act 
authorizes review of the magistrate judge's detention order in fed­
eral district court, but fails to specify which district court has the 
authority to review the order.7 The government argued that only 
the district court in the charging district possesses that authority.8 
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
1. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 310 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
2. 62 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1995). 
3. [d. at 1234. 
4. [d. Evans was brought before the magistrate judge in Arizona pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4O(a). [d. See infra note 35 for the pertinent text 
of Rule 4O(a). 
5. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1234-35. 
6. [d. at 1235. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. I, 
§§ 202-210, 98 Stat. 1976-87 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3141-3150 
(1994». 
7. See infra note 60 for the pertinent text of § 3145(b). 
8. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235. 
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Ninth Circuit agreed.9 The dissent, however, agreed with Evans in 
concluding that the district court in the district of his arrest was the 
proper tribunal to review the magistrate judge's order of 
detention.10 
This Note focuses upon the proper interpretation of sections 
3145(a) and (b) of the Bail Reform Act of 198411 by analyzing the 
decision of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Evans. Part I pro­
vides a brief history of the concept of bail and examines the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 as well as the procedural complexities involved 
in federal criminal proceedings in both the single- and multi-district 
contexts. Part I also introduces the concept of venue embodied 
within the United States Constitution. Part II of this Note discusses 
the facts of the principal case, Evans, and traces it through disposi­
tion at the district court level to the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Against the backdrop of 
the controlling authorities, Part III analyzes the holding of Evans, 
with a critique of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. 
This Part of the Note concludes that the majority correctly deter­
mined that the district of prosecution is the proper district to review 
the detention order issued by the magistrate judge in the district of 
arrest. Finally, Part IV addresses howthe conflict arising in Evans 
is properly resolved through this conclusion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of Bail 
The statutory history of bail began with the passage of the Judi­
ciary Act of 1789.12 In this Act, Congress provided a right to bail 
for defendants accused of non-capital crimes in federal courts.D 
9. Id. at 1237. 
10. Id. at 1239-40 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
11. Subsection (b) of § 3145 authorizes review of an order of detention upon re­
quest by the defendant, while subsection (a) authorizes review of a release order upon a 
motion by either the government or the defendant. See infra notes 59 and 60 for the 
pertinent text of subsections (a) and (b). 
12. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789) (current version at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1994». 
13. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,4 (1951) ("From the passage of the Judici­
ary Act of 1789 ... federal law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a 
non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail."); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 
F.2d 984,997 (2d Cir. 1986) ("First Judiciary Act ... provided a right to bail in all cases 
except capital offenses ...."). See also JoAnn M. Arkfeld, Comment, The Federal Bail 
Reform Act of 1984: Effect of the Dangerousness Determination on Pretrial Detention, 
19 PAC. L.J. 1435, 1436 (1988) ("Since 1789, Congress has provided a right to bail in 
noncapital criminal cases ...."); Heidi J. Herman, Note, United States v. Salerno: The 
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However, courts were required to detain defendants who were 
viewed as risks of flight, likely to tamper with witnesses or jurors, or 
charged with capital crimes.14 The 1789 Act remained substantially 
unchanged until the implementation of the Bail Reform Act of 
1966.15 
In the 1966 Act, Congress attempted to address public dissatis­
faction with the practice of courts detaining indigent defendants by 
imposing artificially high bail requirements.16 The 1966 Act re­
quired courts to either release defendants on their own recogni­
zance or grant defendants conditional release pending trial, unless 
the judicial officer determined that release would not adequately 
assure the appearance of the defendantP A shortcoming of the 
1966 Act was that it did not allow the judicial officer to consider the 
future dangerousness of a defendant in making the determination 
of whether to grant pretrial release. IS The Act failed to address the 
Bail Reform Act is Here to Stay, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 165, 166 (1989) ("The Judiciary 
Act guaranteed all persons accused of non-capital crimes the right to be released on 
bail. "). 
14. The rationale behind the first two exceptions to the admission of a defendant 
to bail was that "there will not be a fair trial if the accused is not present or if the jurors 
and witnesses have been threatened or bribed." Herman, supra note 13, at 167 n.20. In 
capital crimes, defendants were denied bail because they were considered to be extreme 
risks of flight. Id. A defendant "released on bail with the knowledge that if he appears 
in court, he will face the possibility of a death sentence or life imprisonment, may 
reevaluate his options before entering the court room." Id. See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4; 
Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1002; United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1326 n.6 
(D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). 
15. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3151 (1982) (repealed 1984». 
16. Michael Harwin, Detaining for Danger Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: 
Paradoxes of Procedure and Proof, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 1091, 1093 (1993); Arkfeld, supra 
note 13, at 1436. Additionally, this concern was addressed in the passage of the 1984 
Bail Reform Act. See, e.g., United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890 (8th CiT. 1985) 
(One of "[t]he major differences between the [1966] Bail Reform Act and the 1984 Act 
... [is] the prohibition against using inordinately high financial conditions to detain 
defendants. "). 
17. Pub. L. No. 89-465,80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. 
§§ 3141-3151 (1982) (repealed 1984». The 1966 Act provided in pertinent part: 
Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by 
death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released 
pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an un­
secured appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless 
the officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such release will 
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. 
18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1982) (repealed 1984). 
18. See Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. 
§§ 3145-3151 (1982) (repealed 1984». See also Orta, 760 F.2d at 890. 
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growing concern for crimes being committed by dangerous individ­
uals awaiting trial.19 This increasing problem was one of the major 
impetuses behind the Bail Reform Act of 1984.20 
The 1984 Act "mark[ed] a significant departure" from the fun­
damental philosophy that the concept of bail exists solely to assure 
the appearance of the defendant for tria1.21 It focused upon a con­
cern for community safety and the need for preventive detention22 
by requiring the judicial officer to consider the dangerousness of 
the defendant in making bail determinations.23 
The Bail Reform Act specifically governs the process of deter­
19. See Pub. L. No. 89-465. 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. 
§§ 3141-3151 (1982) (repealed 1984)}. See also Harwin, supra note 16, at 1093; Arkfeld, 
supra note 13, at 1437. 
20. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473. tit. II, ch. I, §§ 202-210, 98 Stat. 
1976-87 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U~S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1994}). See, e.g., Orta, 
760 F.2d at 890 (the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was "a legislative response to growing 
public concern over increased crime and the perceived connection between crime and 
defendants released on bail"); United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 
1985) (1984 revision of the Bail Reform Act responded to the "'alarming problem' of 
crimes committed by persons on release"). The Senate Report stated that the revisions 
to the 1966 Act incorporated into the 1984 Act "reflect the Committee's determination 
that Federal bail laws must address the alarming problem of crimes committed by per­
sons on release and must give the courts adequate authority to make release decisions 
that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if re­
leased." S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182,3185. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 also revised the 1966 Act in order to address 
such other problems as: 
(a) the need to consider community safety in setting nonfinancial pretrial con­
ditions of release, (b) the need to expand the list of statutory release condi­
tions, (c) the need to permit the pretrial detention of defendants as to whom 
no conditions of release will assure their appearance at trial or assure the 
safety of the community or of other persons, (d) the need for a more appropri­
ate basis for deciding on post-conviction release, (e) the need to permit tem­
porary detention of persons who are arrested while they are on a form of 
conditional release ... , and (f) the need to provide procedures for revocation 
of release for violation of the conditions of release. 
Id. For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of the Bail Reform Acts of 1966 
and 1984, see Harwin, supra note 16, at 1092-96; Arkfeld, supra note 13, at 1439-48. 
21. S. REp. No. 225, supra note 20, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3185­
86. 
22. In contrast, the primary focus of the 1966 Act was on the release of defend­
ants before trial. Arkfeld, supra note 13, at 1441. See, e.g., Williams, 753 F.2d at 332 
("Previously, under the Bail Reform Act of 1966, the exclusive consideration in setting 
bail was whether the defendant would appear at trial.") (footnote omitted). 
The term "preventive detention" refers to "pretrial incarceration of a defendant if 
release would pose a danger to the community or if the defendant would be likely to 
commit crime if released pending trial." Arkfeld, supra note 13, at 1441 n.60. 
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b} (1994). E.g., Williams, 753 F.2d at 332 (In the 1984 
revision to the Bail Reform Act, "federal courts have been accorded the power to 
weigh the risk to the community posed by a defendant's release pending trial."). 
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mining whether defendants accused of federal crimes should be de­
tained or released. The procedures to be followed in reaching the 
bail determination stage, however, are prescribed by the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
B. 	 Procedural Complexities 
A common situation in criminal cases involving violations of 
federal law arises where a defendant is arrested in one district, but 
the alleged violations-and subsequent indictment-occur in an­
other district, giving rise to a multi-district proceeding.24 This type 
of proceeding raises an interesting question for the judiciary: Which 
is the proper district court to review a federal magistrate judge's 
detention or release order-the district court in the district of arrest 
or the district court in the charging district? This issue does not 
surface in a single-district proceeding because the alleged offenses 
have occurred in the same district as the arrest.25 In a multi-district 
proceeding, however, the procedure is somewhat different, and de­
termining which district court has the authority to review the magis­
trate's order is slightly more complex. 
1. 	 Single-District Proceeding Under Rules 5 and 5.1 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rules 5 and 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure set 
out the requirements and procedure to follow in the situation where 
a defendant is arrested in the same district where the alleged of­
fenses occurred.26 Rule 5 requires an "initial appearance" of the 
defendant "without unnecessary delay before the nearest available 
federal magistrate judge. "27 At the initial appearance, the magis­
trate judge must inform the defendant of the complaint against him 
and of his general rightS.28 Additionally, the magistrate judge is re­
24. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factual 
situation which gives rise to the multi-district proceeding as in United States v. Evans. 
25. It is clear that in the single-district proceeding the entire process-from the 
moment of indictment to final disposition of the case-takes place in a single district. 
No other district has any interest in the matter. 
26. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5, 5.1. For a thorough discussion of the requirements and 
procedures under Rules 5 and 5.1, see generally David J. Charies, Preliminary Hear­
ings, 81 OEO. L.J. 1094 (1993). 
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). The "initial appearance" is "[t]he first court appear­
ance for a defendant charged with a federal offense." JOHN L. WEINBERG, FEDERAL 
BAIL AND DETENTION HANDBOOK § 3.01, at 3-1 (1992). 
28. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). The defendant's general rights include, inter alia, the 
right to counselor to request assignment of counsel, and the right to remain silent. Id. 
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quired to "det~in or conditionally release the defendant as provided 
by statute."29 The magistrate judge must also, under Rule 5, inform 
the defendant that he is entitled to a "preliminary examination."30 
In the event that the defendant is arrested without a warrant, the 
magistrate judge must make a finding of probable cause in compli­
ance with Federal Rule 4(a).31 
Federal Rule 5.1 addresses the "preliminary examination" re­
ferred to in Rule 5. Rule 5.1 expands upon the Rule 5 probable 
cause requirement.32 Under Rule 5.1, if the magistrate judge finds 
that "there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it," the magistrate 
judge must "hold the defendant to answer in district court. "33 How­
ever, if no probable cause is found, the magistrate judge must dis­
miss the complaint and release the defendant.34 
2. 	 Multi-District Proceeding Under Rule 40 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 
The starting point in a multi-district proceeding is set forth in 
Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the multi­
district situation, Rule 4O(a) requires the defendant to be taken 
Rule 5(c) also addresses the time frame in which a defendant must receive a prelimi­
nary examination. Id. 
29. 	 Id. 
30. Id. The defendant has the right to waive the preliminary examination. If the 
defendant waives the preliminary examination, the magistrate judge must hold the de­
fendant to answer in federal district court. If the defendant does not waive the prelimi­
nary examination, the magistrate judge is required to schedule one. Id. 
The initial appearance and preliminary examination constitute two separate pro­
ceedings. The preliminary examination can be held at the same time as the initial ap­
pearance, but "in practice this ordinarily does not occur." FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 advisory 
committee's note. -"Usually counsel need time to prepare for the preliminary examina­
tion and as a consequence a separate date is typically set for the preliminary examina­
tion." Id. . 
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1. Rule 4(a) states that 
"[i]f it appears from the complaint ... that there is probable cause to believe that an 
offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the 
arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it." FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 4(a). 
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a). See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975) (hold­
ing that the Fourth Amendment requires "a timely judicial determination of probable 
cause as a prerequisite to detention"). 
33. 	 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a). 
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(b). Preliminary examination is unnecessary in two situa­
tions. The first is where the defendant has been indicted or an information has been 
filed in federal district court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). The second is where the defendant 
elects to waive the preliminary examination. Id. 
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"without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal 
magistrate judge," which is the magistrate judge in the district of 
arrest.35 The preliminary proceedings under Rule 40 are required 
to be conducted in accordance with Rules 5 and 5.1.36 Conse­
quently, the defendant is entitled to an "initial appearance" as well 
as a "preliminary examination" before the magistrate judge in the 
district of arrest.37 However, Rule 40(a) allows the defendant to 
elect to have the preliminary examination conducted in the charg­
ing district.38 Additionally, Rule 4O(a) ·provides that if the defend­
ant is held to answer for the offense committed, the defendant must 
answer in the district in which prosecution is pending.39 
Rule 40(b) requires the magistrate judge to inform the defend­
ant of the provisions of Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedtire.40 Rule 20 grants the defendant the right to waive trial 
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). Rule 4O(a) provides: 
If a person is arrested in a district other than that in which the offense is al­
leged to have been committed, that person must be taken without unnecessary 
delay before the nearest available federal magistrate judge. . . . If held to 
answer, the defendant must be held to answer in the district court in which the 
prosecution is pending-provided that a warrant is issued in that district .... 
Id. E.g., Parman v. United States, 399 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that one arrested in 
a district distant from that of the commission of the offense must be presented before a 
magistrate in the district of arrest), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858 (1968). 
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the requirements and procedures under Rules 5 and 5.1. In analyzing the 
language of, and purposes behind, Rule 4O(a), it is important to be aware of the rele­
vance of Federal Rules 5 and 5.1. Cases that have addressed Rules 5 and 5.1 have 
determined that custody and control of the defendant must be relinquished, without 
unnecessary delay after arrest, to the magistrate judge whose function is to advise the 
defendant of his rights and to conduct a hearing as soon as possible to determine 
whether there is sufficient probable cause to warrant further detention. See, e.g., Ricks 
V. United States, 334 F.2d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The Notes of the Advisory Com­
mittee on Rules for the 1979 amendment to Rule 40 state that "[u]nder rule 5.1 dealing 
with the preliminary examination, the defendant is to be held to answer only upon 
showing of probable cause that an offense has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it." FED. R. CRIM. P. 40 advisory committee's note (emphasis added). The 
rule that the defendant must be taken before the nearest available magistrate judge is 
invoked for the protection of a defendant who may be prejudiced by a delay. See gener­
ally United States V. Bandy, 421 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1970); United States V. Asher, 367 F. 
Supp.895 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). 
37. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5,5.1. 
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). 
39. Id. E.g., United States V. Perkins, 433 F.2dl182, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Rule 
40 specifies the procedures governing transfer of an arrestee from the district of his 
arrest to another district wherein the trial is properly to be held."). See also FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 40 advisory committee's note. 
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(b). Rule 4O(b) provides: "In addition to the statements 
required by Rule 5, the federal magistrate judge shall inform the defendant of the pro­
visions of Rule 20." Id. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 20. 
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in the district of prosecution and allow the district of arrest to hear 
the case.41 The waiver, however, is subject to approval by the 
United States attorney for each district.42 
Federal Rule 40(c) requires documentation generated by the 
preliminary examination and any bail collected to be transmitted to 
the district court in the district of prosecution.43 The transmission is 
to be made upon determination of detention or discharge of the 
defendant pursuant to the Bail Reform Act.44 
Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the 
general procedure to follow in single- and multi-district proceed­
ings, they provide no guidance in initiating a hearing to determine 
whether pretrial detention of the defendant is appropriate.45 More­
over, the Rules render no insight into what occurs at the detention 
hearing, or what happens in the event any of the parties contest the 
findings of the magistrate judge.46 The Bail Reform Act of 1984 
addresses these concerns. 
3. The Bail Reform Act of 198447 
Section 3141 of the Bail Reform Act authorizes the judicial of­
ficer, before whom the defendant is brought, to order such person 
released or detained.48 Section 3142 of the Act requires a determi­
41. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20. Rule 20(a) provides in pertinent part: 
A defendant arrested ... in a district other than that in which an indictment or 
information is pending ... may state in writing a wish ... to waive trial in the 
district in which the indictment or information is pending, and to consent to 
disposition of the case in the district in which that defendant was arrested, ... 
subject to the approval of the United States attorney for each district. 
Id. 
42. Id. 
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(c). 
44. Id. 
45. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 5,5.1,40. 
46. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 5,5.1,40. 
47. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 1, §§ 202-210, 98 Stat. 
1976 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3141-3151 (1994». 
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3141(a) (1994). Any judicial officer who is authorized to order 
the arrest of a person under 18 U.S.c. § 3041 (1994) may conduct the hearing to deter­
mine whether the defendant should be detained or released. § 3141. "[T]hese 'judicial 
officers' can include Justices or judges of the United States, magistrates, and other 
court-appointed officials, and a variety of state court judges." Michael Edmund 
O'Neill, A Two-Pronged Standard ofAppellate Review for Pretrial Bail Determinations, 
99 YALE L.J. 885, 889 n.39 (1990). Magistrate judges are empowered by the Federal 
Magistrates Act to "issue orders pursuant to section 3142 [of the Bail Reform Act] ... 
concerning release or detention" of defendants prior to trial. 28 U.S.c. § 636(a)(2) 
(1994). See Harwin, supra note 16, at 1096 n.36; O'Neill, supra, at 889. Thus, the mag­
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nation of release or detention of the defendant pending tria1.49 
Under section 3142, the magistrate judge must conduct a detention 
hearing upon motion of the prosecution or, in certain circum­
stances, upon motion of the magistrate judge herself.50 The deten­
tion hearing is to be held "immediately upon the person's first 
appearance before the judicial officer" unless a continuance is 
sought by either the defendant or the government.51 
istrate judge often makes the initial bail decision. Harwin, supra note 16, at 1096; 
O'Neill, supra, at 889. 
49. 18 U.S.c. § 3142 (1994). 
50. 	 § 3142(f)(1), (2). Section 3142(f) provides: 
The judicial officer shall hold a hearing to detennine whether any condition or 
combination of conditions set forth in subsection (c) of this section will reason­
ably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any 
other person and the community­
(1) upon motion of the attorney for the Government, in a case that in­
volves­
(A) 	a crime of violence; 
(B) 	an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment 
or death; 
(C) 	an offense for which a maximum tenn of imprisonment of ten 
years or more is prescribed [in certain Acts] ... ; or 
(D) any felony if such person has been convicted of two or more of­
fenses ... ; or 
(2) upon motion of the attorney for the Government or upon the judicial 
officer's own motion in a case, that involves­
(A) 	a serious risk that such person will flee; or 
(B) 	a serious risk that such person will obstruct . . . justice, or 
threaten, injure, or intimidate ... a prospective witness or juror. 

§ 3142(f). 

51. § 3142(f). "In practice, the defendant makes an 'initial appearance' before 
the magistrate" judge. Harwin, supra note 16, at 1096-97; O'Neill, supra note 48, at 889. 
The "initial appearance" is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5. At this 
appearance, the government can move for a detention hearing pursuant to § 3142(f)(I). 
Harwin, supra note 16, at 1097. The Bail Refonn Act authorizes the magistrate judge 
to conduct a detention hearing at the defendant's initial appearance. O'Neill, supra 
note 48, at 889. With this in mind, there are basically five dispositions at which the 
courts can arrive regarding detention or release: 
1. Order "temporary detention." If the case is one that qualifies for tempo­
rary detention under the statute, the court must so order. See § 3142(d) ... . 
2. 	 Conduct a "detention hearing" immediately. See § 3142(e) and (f) ... . 
3. Continue the case three to five days upon a motion for detention hearing, 
while defendant remains in custody. See § 3142(f) .... 
4. Order defendant's release on his personal recognizance bond or an un­
secured appearance bond. See § 3142(b) .... 
5. Set other conditions for release. See § 3142(c) .... 
WEINBERG, supra note 27, § 3.03 at 3-2. "As a routine matter ... magistrates grant 
short continuances, thereby giving the parties time to prepare for the actual detention 
. hearing." O'Neill, supra note 48, at 889 (footnotes omitted). As a result, the detention 
hearing is nonnally conducted at the "preliminary examination" proceeding before the 
magistrate judge, which is governed by Federal Rule 5.1. 
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Section 3142 of the Act also sets out the details of the "release 
or detention" requirement.52 Subsections (b) and (c) provide two 
possibilities for the defendant's release: (1) on personal recogni­
zance or unsecured appearance bond,53 or (2) on certain conditions 
if deemed necessary by the judicial officer.54 Under subsection 
3142(e), the magistrate judge must detain the defendant if there are 
no conditions that will reasonably assure the appearance of the de­
fendant or protect the safety of the community.55 
Subsection 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act guides the magis­
trate judge in determining whether to release or detain a defendant 
by specifying the factors to be considered at the detention hear­
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1994). 
53. § 3142(b). Section 3142(b) provides in pertinent part: 
The judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the person on personal 
recognizance. or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an 
amount specified by the court, subject to the condition that the person not 
commit a ... crime during the period of release, unless the judicial officer 
determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the 
person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the 
community. 
Id. Release on "personal recognizance" means: 
Pre-trial release based on the person's own promise that he will show up for 
trial (no bond required). A species of bail in which the defendant acknowl­
edges personally without sureties his obligation to appear in court at the next 
hearing or trial date of his case. It is used in place of a bail bond when the 
judge or magistrate is satisfied that the'defendant will appear without the need 
of a surety bond or other form of security. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1290 (6th ed. 1990). An "unsecured appearance bond" is 
"[a] bail bond for which the defendant is fully liable upon failure to appear in court 
when ordered to do so or upon breach of a material condition of release, but which is 
not secured by any deposit or lien upon property." Id. at 140. 
54. § 3142(c). If the magistrate judge determines that release of the defendant 
under subsection (b) will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant or will 
pose a threat to the safety of other people or the community, the magistrate judge may 
order release of the defendant subject to certain conditions. §.3142(c)(I). The first 
uniform condition is that "the person not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during 
the period of release." § 3142(c)(I)(A). Furthermore, numerous other conditions, or 
combinations of conditions, may be employed by the magistrate judge to reasonably 
assure the appearance of the defendant and the safety of the community. 
§ 3142(c)(I)(B). For instance, the magistrate judge may impose the conditions that the 
defendant: remain in the custody of a designated person; maintain employment or ac­
tively seek employment; maintain an education; avoid contact with the alleged victim of 
the crime; comply with a curfew; and so on. See § 3142(c)(I)(B)(i)-(xiv). The list of 
conditions provided in § 3142(c) that the magistrate judge may impose on the defend­
ant is not exhaustive .. Any combination of conditions may be set by the magistrate 
judge, so long as the conditions are determined to "reasonably assure the appearance of 
the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." 
§ 3142(c)(I)(B). 
55. § 3142(e). 
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ing.56 The magistrate judge utilizes a balance of those factors to 
determine whether release of the defendant will assure the defend­
ant's appearance and protect the community.57 
After the detention hearing is conducted, and an order issued, 
the result is often disputed by either the government or the defend­
ant.58 In such a circumstance, section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act 
allows for review of the release59 or detention order.60 A motion 
for review must be filed with the "court having original jurisdiction 
over the offense"-the United States federal district court.61 Sec­
56. § 3142(g). The factors that the magistrate judge may consider in making the 
determination of detention or release include: 
(I) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged ... ; 
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person; 
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including­
(A) 	the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, em­
ployment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, 
community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol 
abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court 
proceedings; and 
(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was 
on probation, on parole, or on other release ... ; and 
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community 
that would be posed by the person's release. 
Id. 
57. Id. If the information obtained reveals that there will be no reasonable assur­
ance of the appearance of the defendant or of the safety of others or the community, 
the defendant shall be ordered detained under subsection (e). § 3142(e). 
58. See United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1995). See infra 
notes 85-91 and accompanying text for the facts of Evans. In Evans, the defendant 
disputed the detention order issued by the magistrate judge and sought review pursuant 
to § 3145(b) of the Bail Reform Act. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235. See infra note 60 for the 
pertinent text of § 3145(b). If the government had disputed a release order, review 
would have presumably been brought pursuant to § 3145(a). See infra note 59 for the 
pertinent text of § 3145(a). 
59. § 3145(a). Section 3145(a) provides: 

If a person is ordered released by a magistrate ... ­
(I) the attorney for the Government may file, with the court having origi­
nal jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation of the order or 
amendment of the conditions of release; and 
(2) the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over 
the offense, a motion for amendment of the conditions of release. 
The motion shall be determined promptly. 
Id. 
60. § 3145(b). Section 3145(b) states: "If a person is ordered detained by a magis­
trate, ... the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over the of­
fense, a motion for revocation or amendment of the order. The motion shall be 
determined promptly." Id. 
61. § 3145(a), (b). See WEINBERG, supra note 27, § 9.02(a) at 9-2 (The language 
of section 3145 referring to "the court having original jurisdiction" must "certainly 
mean[] review by a district judge. "). 
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tion 3145 mandates that the motion for review "shall be determined 
promptly."62 
Although section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act does not specify 
the standard of review to be followed by the district court, the 
United States courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have 
uniformly determined that the district court judge should conduct 
de novo review.63 The decision to conduct de novo review, how­
ever, is at the district court's discretion.64 Furthermore, exactly 
what is involved in de novo detention or release order review is not 
specified by the courts of appeals.65 There are almost as many vari­
ations on the de novo standard as there are courts that have de­
cided the issue.66 
Section 3145 also allows either party to appeal from the district 
court's determination of detention or release, or from the district 
court's decision to deny revocation or amendment of an existing 
order.67 The section allows appeal to be brought before the appro­
priate United States court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3731.68 
62. § 3145. 
63. WEINBERG, supra note 27, § 9.02(c) at 9-4. See also O'Neill, supra note 48, at 
891 n.60; Bruce D. Pringle, Bail and Detention in Federal Criminal Proceedings, 22 
CoLO. LAW. 913, 922 (1993); Sally Baumler, Note, Appellate Review Under the Bail 
Reform Act, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 483, 503. 
"De novo review involves no deference to the lower court. The' [reviewing] court 
redetennines the issue as though being presented with it for the first time." Baumler, 
supra, at 503 n.213. 
64. O'Neill, supra note 48, at 891 n.56. See, e.g., United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 
1390,1394-95 (3d Cir. 1985) (district court could detennine whether to conduct de novo 
review). 
65. O'Neill, supra note 48, at 891 n.60. 
66. See United States v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1991) (district judge 
may review transcript of magistrate hearing; in the alternative, district judge can "start 
from scratch," but must follow same procedure as magistrate); United States v. Koenig, 
912 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1990) (district judge should review evidence that was 
before magistrate judge and make independent detennination whether magistrate's 
findings are correct; district judge may hold additional evidentiary hearings); United 
States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1481-82 (8th Cir. 1985) (de novo review with all possible 
options available to the magistrate); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 249 (5th Cir. 
1985) (district judge acts de novo, and review could be an independent detennination, 
or based on evidence presented to magistrate judge and additional evidence obtained 
by district judge); United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1985) (district court 
should reach "own independent conclusion"); Delker, 757 F.2d at 1394 (standard of 
review is de novo and within discretion of district judge whether to conduct own eviden­
tiary hearing). 
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (1994). 
68. § 3145(c). Section 3145(c) provides: "An appeal from a release or detention 
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C. 	 Constitutional Requirements of Venue: Article III, Section 2, 

Clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment 

In a multi-district proceeding, the issue of where the defendant 
can constitutionally be prosecuted is pertinent in ascertaining which 
district court has "original jurisdiction over the offense" for pur­
poses of pretrial bail decision review.69 In federal criminal prosecu­
tions, proper venue lies solely in the "district in which the offense 
was committed."70 This rule derives from the constitutional guar­
antee of trial "in the State where the said Crimes shall have been 
committed" under Article III, Section 2, Clause 3,71 and the Sixth 
Amendment right to "an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed."72 One of the justifi­
cations behind the constitutional guarantees of venue in the state or 
order, or from a decision denying revocation or amendment of such an order, is gov­
erned by the provisions of section 1291 of title 28 and section 3731 of this title." Id. 
Section 1291 of title 28 and § 3731 of title 18 of the United States Code provide 
that an appeal from a decision of a district court shall lie to the court of appeals and that 
the court of appeals shall have jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3731 (1994). 
69. 	 See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1994). 
70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. Rule 18 provides: 
Except as otherwise permitted ... , the prosecution shall be had in a district in 
which the offense was committed. The court shall fix the place of trial within 
the district with due regard to the convenience of the defendant and the wit­
nesses and the prompt administration of justice. 
Id. 
71. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. See, e.g., Hanson v. United States. 285 F.2d 27, 
28 (9th Cir. 1960) ("The Constitution of the United States grants an accused the right to 
a trial within the state and federal district in which his offense was committed."). 
72. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. Strictly speaking, the requirement provided in Arti­
cle III, Section 2, Clause 3 is a venue requirement while the requirement set out in the 
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution is considered a "vicinage" requirement. The 
Sixth Amendment is commonly called the "vicinage" requirement because it "specifies 
the geographic area from which jurors in criminal proceedings must be drawn" and 
"does not, as is often mistakenly assumed, establish the venue in which the proceedings 
themselves must take place." Wm. Henry Jernigan, Jr., Note, The Sixth Amendment 
and the Right to a Trial by a Jury ofthe Vicinage, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 399, 399-400 
(1974); Scott Kafker, Comment, The Right to Venue and the Right to an Impartial Jury: 
Resolving the Conflict in the Federal Constitution, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 729, 729 n.2 
(1985). See Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 314 n.2 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1083 (1981); United States v. Countryside Farms, Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) <j[ 
61,629 (D. Utah Jan. 28,1977). However, the distinction has been referred to as "unim­
portant." Id. at 72,604. See 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE­
DURE: CRIMINAL 20 § 301, at 190 (2d ed. 1982). "In practice, the sixth amendment has 
consistently been interpreted as guaranteeing trial in the district where the crime was 
committed." Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The Obstruction of Justice 
Puzzle,82 MICH. L. REv. 90,90 n.3 (1983). See, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 351 
U.S. 215, 220 (1956); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 232-33 (1924). 
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district where the crime was committed was to "facilitat[ e] factfind­
ing by holding trial near where the relevant evidence could be 
found. "73 In addition, the venue provisions avoid prejudice to an 
accused's case that might result from facing trial in a district where 
it would be difficult to obtain witnesses in preparation for trial.74 
Because the right to trial where the crime was committed is a right 
guaranteed by the Constitution, only the defendant may waive the 
right and move for a change of venue.75 
73. Note, supra note 72, at 107-08. See Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 640 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("basic policy" of venue best served by trial where the 
"witnesses and relevant circumstances surrounding the contested issues" will be found); 
United States v. DiJames, 731 F.2d 758, 762 (11th Cir. 1984) (One of the policy reasons 
for the venue provisions is that the jurors "know the local conditions surrounding the 
criminal acts," thus they are able to "draw the most accurate inferences from the evi­
dence presented at trial."); United States v. Nadolny, 601 F.2d 940, 943 (7th CiT. 1979) 
("Venue traditionally has been based on notions of fair, fast and efficient administration 
of trials. When venue is laid in the proper district-the one in which the crime was 
committed-witnesses are more readily available, and the operative facts and situs of 
the incident are closer at hand."), overruled by U.S. v. Fredrick, 835 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 
1987). 
The constitutional venue provisions arose out of the common law, which required 
criminal prosecutions to be sought in the county where the crime was committed. See 
Note, supra note 72, at 105; 1 J. BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 49 (2d ed. 
1913). The purpose behind this common-law rule was: 
[So] that the circumstances of [the] crime may be more clearly examined, and 
that the knowledge which the jurors thereby receive of [the] general character 
[of the defendant], and of the credibility of the witnesses, might assist them in 
pronouncing, with a greater degree of certainty, upon [the defendant's] inno­
cence or guilt. 
16 PARL. HIST. ENG. 490 (1769). In essence, the common-law justification for venue 
was that it provided "[b]etter factfinding." Note, supra note 72, at 106. Federal consti­
tutional venue provisions were promulgated with the same emphasis in mind. Id. at 
107. For a thorough treatment of the history behind the federal constitutional venue 
provisions, see Kafker, supra note 72, at 741-50; Note, supra note 72, at 105-0B. 
74. DUames, 731 F.2d at 762. The court in DUames also articulated a third policy 
reason behind the venue provisions: "[S]ince most crimes usually take place in the dis­
trict where the defendant resides, the venue provisions try to reduce the difficulties to 
the defendant that would be caused by a trial at a distance from his home and friends." 
Id. But cf Note, supra note 72, at 107 n.89 ("[T]he desire to spare the accused the 
rigors of trial far from home is no longer a compelling justification .... [T]he district-of­
the-crime test will not even serve this policy goal in many cases, since people today are 
far more likely to commit crimes outside their district of residence than they once 
were."). 
75. Donna A. Balaguer, Venue, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1259, 1260 (1993). See, 
e.g., DUames, 731 F.2d at 761 ("[a] defendant cannot be forced to accept a change of 
venue against his will"); United States v. Abbott Lab., 505 F.2d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 1974) 
(change of venue cannot be ordered against defendant's will), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 
(1975); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir. 1952) (a defendant "is not 
obliged to forgo his constitutional right to an impartial trial in the district wherein the 
offense is alleged to have been committed"). But cf Kafker, supra note 72, at 746 
(suggesting that the Sixth Amendment right to venue is not an absolute right of the 
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Federal statutes that define crimes often contain provisions 
that indicate where the proper venue for prosecution liesJ6 In the 
absence of a provision by Congress specifying the proper venue, 
courts look to where the crime was "committed" as required by the 
Constitution.77 This involves, at a basic level, an analysis of the na­
ture of the alleged offense and the location of the acts constituting 
the offense to determine where the prosecution should be sought.78 
The concept of venue is separate and distinct from the concept 
of jurisdictionJ9 However, courts occasionally "speak in terms of 
jurisdiction when they mean venue," which can cause confusion.80 
"Jurisdiction" refers to the inherent power of a court to decide a 
case,81 whereas "venue" specifies the particular geographic area in 
which a court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case.82 
As such, venue may be waived by the defendant, but jurisdiction 
may not.83 
defendant); United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the 
district court's judicial convenience exception to the defendant's right to venue, but 
leaving open the possibility that the defendant's right to venue is not absolute). 
76. Balaguer, supra note 75, at 1263. Although Congress can provide venue pro­
visions in federal statutes, it "has no authority to establish in a criminal statute venue 
which would not be permitted under the Constitution." [d. at 1261. 
77. Id. at 1263. See, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220 (1956) 
("place [of the crime] is determined by the acts of the accused that violate a statute"); 
United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1188 (2d Cir.) ("When a 
crime consists of a single noncontinuing act, it is 'committed' in the district where the 
act is performed."), cert. denied sub nom. Lavery v. United States, 493 U.S. 933 (1989). 
78. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 635 (1961); United States v. Anderson, 
328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946); United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982); United States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 902,905 (1st Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States v. O'Donnell, 510 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). 
Some courts have adopted a more elaborate test to ascertain where the offense was 
committed, called the "substantial contacts rule." Beech-Nut Nutrition, 871 F.2d at 
1188-89; United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 1985). The "substantial con­
tacts rule" examines "the site of the defendant's acts, the elements and nature of the 
crime, the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of each district 
for accurate fact finding." Beech-Nut Nutrition, 871 F.2d at 1188-89. See also Reed, 773 
F.2d at 481. 
79. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 
U.S. 942 (1981). 
80. Id. 
81. BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY 853, 1557 (6th ed. 1990). See Hagans v. Lavine, 
415 U.S. 528,538 (1974) Gurisdiction is the authority conferred by Congress to decide a 
case); Roberts, 618 F.2d at 537 ("subject matter jurisdiction ... refers to the types of 
cases a court is authorized to hear"). 
82. BLACK'S LAW DICflONARY 1557 (6th ed. 1990). 
83. E.g., Roberts, 618 F.2d at 537 (Subject matter jurisdiction is not transferable. 
On the other hand, "[a] criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried in the 
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II. UNITED STATES V. EVANs84 
A. 	 Case Facts 
In March of 1994, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of West Virginia issued a warrant for the arrest of 
John Byrnes Evans upon the return of an indictment charging Ev­
ans with numerous violations of federallaw.85 Evans was arrested 
in Arizona, his state of residence, and brought before a federal 
magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the District 
of Arizona pursuant to Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.86 
At Evans's "initial appearance"87 before the Arizona federal 
magistrate judge, the government moved for a pretrial detention 
hearing.88 The magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and 
continued the matter to allow time for the United States attorney 
for the District of West Virginia to respond to Evans's proposed 
bond.89 In a subsequent hearing, the magistrate judge determined 
that Evans should not be released on bond and ordered him de­
tained pending tria1.9o Evans sought review of the magistrate 
judge's order in the United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona pursuant to 18 U.S.c. § 3145(b).91 
B. 	 Disposition of the United States District Court for the District 
of Arizona 
On Evans's motion for review, the government moved to have 
the appeal dismissed, arguing that the Arizona district court did not 
have jurisdiction to review the detention order under section 3145 
jurisdiction where the crime was committed. This 'constitutional venue' right ... can be 
waived."). See also Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 
(1939) (discussing the differences between jurisdiction and venue in a civil context). 
84. 	 62 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1995). 
85. Id. at 1234. The violations that Evans was charged with included: "conspiracy 
to possess with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, conspiracy 
to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.c. § 1956, and travel to promote marijuana 
business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)." Id. 
86. 	 Id. See supra note 35 for the text of Rule 40(a). 
87. See supra notes 26-34 and 36 and accompanying text discussing the "initial 
appearance" and Federal Rule 5, and how they relate to Federal Rule 40. 
88. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1234. The motion for a pretrial detention hearing was pre­
sumably brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). See supra note 50 for the text of 
§ 3142(f). 
89. 	 Evans, 62 F.3d at 1234. 
90. 	 Id. at 1234-35. 
91. 	 Id. at 1235. See supra note 60 for the text of § 3145(b). 
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of the Bail Reform Act.92 The government asserted that jurisdic­
tion remained solely with the West Virginia district court, which is­
sued the warrant, as "the court having original jurisdiction over the 
offense" under section 3145.93 
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the Arizona district 
court determined that it had jurisdiction to review the detention 
order, and ordered Evans released on a $100,000 bond.94 The gov­
ernment appealed the release order to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.95 In addition, the government re­
quested an emergency stay of the district court's release order.96 
The Ninth Circuit stayed the release order pending resolution of 
the matter.97 
C. 	 Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit 
1. Judge Hug's Majority Opinion 
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit vacated the Arizona district court's order of release.98 
The Ninth Circuit accepted the government's argument that the 
proper district court to review the magistrate judge's detention or­
der was the district court in the district of prosecution.99 Judge Hug 
began the court's opinion by discussing the general procedure to 
follow when an arrest is made in one district for a federal offense 
alleged to have occurred in another district. Ioo 
The opinion then addressed the defendant's assertion that sec­
tion 3145 of the Bail Reform Act affords the district court in the 
district of arrest jurisdiction to review the detention order.10I Ev­
ans argued that 18 U.S.c. § 3231 grants all federal district courts 
"original jurisdiction" over federal offenses.I02 The majority ac­
92. 	 Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235. 
93. 	 Id. 
94. 	 Id. 
95. Id. The government appealed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). See supra 
note 68 for the text of § 3145(c). 
96. 	 Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235. 
97. 	 Id. 
98. 	 Id. at 1238. 
99. 	 Id. at 1237. 
100. Id. at 1235. See supra notes 35-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the general procedure for the issuance of the detention or release order in the multi­
district ~ontext and review. 
10l. 	 Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235-37. 
102. 	 Id. at 1235-36. Section 3231 of title 18 of the United States Code reads: "The 
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knowledged that this section confers a "broad grant of jurisdic­
tion."103 However, Judge Hug interpreted section 3231 as merely 
providing that "the federal courts, not the state courts, have juris­
diction over federal law offenses. "104 The judge determined that 
the phrase "the court having original jurisdiction over the offense," 
as used in section 3145, has a much narrower meaning when con­
strued in light of the constitutional restrictions on where a defend­
ant can be tried. l05 
The majority pointed out that Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 
and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution establish that, unless 
prosecution is "originally" brought in a district permitted by these 
provisions and the governing statute, the prosecution is subject to 
dismissal by the defendant. l06 Thus, according to the majority, this 
matter is really one of venue, rather than jurisdiction, because the 
constitutional right to venue can be waived by the defendant. 107 
However, the matter can be thought of as jurisdictional in that the 
constitutional standard is required until the defendant waives the 
right. lOB 
The Ninth Circuit majority then analyzed the meaning of the 
phrase "the court having original jurisdiction over the offense" con­
tained in sections 3145(a) and (b) of the Bail Reform Act in light of 
the constitutional, statutory and rule provisions.lo9 The majority fo­
cused on the use of the word "the" in the phrase and determined 
district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the 
courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States." 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3231 (1994). 
103. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. 
104. Id. 
o 105. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See supra 
notes 71 and 72 and accompanying text for the pertinent language of both constitutional 
provisions, respectively. 
106. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. 
107. Id. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text discussing the distinction 
between venue and jurisdiction. 
108. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. Judge Hug stated that: "In a sense, this can be 
thought of as jurisdictional, in that the constitutional requirement as to the place of trial 
must be upheld unless it is waived by the defendant. However, it is more correctly 
designated as a venue requirement because it can be waived." Id. Some early cases 
construed this matter as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction rather than venue. See, 
e.g., United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1916) (addressing the issue of 
whether the Court had "jurisdiction of the subject-matter" as a right guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment); Meltzer v. United States, 188 F.2d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 1951) (holding 
that a defendant can constitutionally be tried only in the district with "[j]urisdiction of 
the subject matter"). 
109. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. Specifically, the provisions utilized by the majority 
in the analysis included: Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment to 
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that it refers to a particular district court having original jurisdiction 
over the offense.llo On a plain reading of the statute, the court 
reasoned that Congress would not have used the word "the" if it 
meant "any" court with original jurisdiction.l11 The majority con­
cluded that "[b]ecause a prosecution must originally be brought in a 
district required by the constitutional and statutory provisions or . 
face dismissal, absent a waiver by the defendant, the phrase is most 
reasonably interpreted as designating the district in which the pros­
ecution is pending," not, as the defendant contended, the district of 
arrest. I 12 
Finally, the court urged that it would be "a strange and un­
wieldy construction" to view the statute as permitting review in any 
district court.113 The majority asserted that Rule 40 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 3145 of the Bail Reform 
Act contemplate review in the district where prosecution is pending 
to avoid any delay by an intermediate determination of bail status 
in the district of arrest.1l4 The majority stated that the district of 
prosecution is "where the bail status of the defendant ultimately 
will be determined during the course of [the] trial."115 
The court found support for its position in Rule 4O(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1l6 Rule 40(c) provides that 
"all papers in the proceeding before the magistrate judge andany 
bail taken is to be transmitted to the clerk of the district court in 
which the prosecution is pending."1l7 The majority concluded that 
it would be unusual to require the papers and bail to be transmitted 
to the district where prosecution is pending if the district of arrest is 
to review the magistrate judge's order.lls 
2. Chief Judge Wallace's Concurring Opinion119 
Chief Judge Wallace began his concurrence by noting that this 
the Constitution; 18 U.S.c. §§ 3145 and 3231; and Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Crim­
inal Procedure. 
110. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1236-37. 
113. Id. at 1237. 
114. Id. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 40; 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1994). 
115. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1237. 
116. Id. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(c). 
117. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1237. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1238 (Wallace, C.l., concurring). 
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issue was one of first impression,12O Like the majority, the concur­
rence acknowledged that section 3145 was more specific than the 
broad grant of jurisdiction under section 3231.121 The concurrence 
also recognized that the use of the word "the" in the statute was 
important in determining the issue. l22 
Chief Judge Wallace relied on Rule 40 for guidance in deter­
mining which court was "the" appropriate tribunal to review the 
magistrate judge's order,123 The concurrence noted that Rule 40(a) 
requires a defendant, who is arrested in a district other than that in 
which the alleged offense was committed, to be brought before the 
nearest available magistrate judge.l24 Additionally, upon conclu­
sion of the preliminary proceedings. Rule 4O(c) requires the papers 
and bail pertaining to the defendant to be transferred to "the dis­
trict court in which the prosecution is pending."125 Thus, according 
to the concurrence, Rule 40 reveals that "the magistrate judge's 
role is limited, and that the district court where the prosecution is 
pending should take over the case as soon as possible."126 
Moreover, the concurrence noted that Rule 40(a) grants the 
defendant the right to elect to have preliminary proceedings con­
ducted in the district where the prosecution is pending.127 Chief 
Judge Wallace urged that this fact further illustrates the limited na­
ture of the magistrate's role.128 The right of election, the concur­
rence asserted, reveals that the purpose for holding the preliminary 
examination before the nearest magistrate judge is to ensure 
prompt review of a defendant's detention.129 
The concurrence utilized section 3142(g) of the Bail Reform 
Act to bolster the position that the proper district to review the 
magistrate judge's order is the district of prosecution.130 Section 
3142(g) requires that in determining detention or release, the mag­
120. Id. 
121. [d. 
122. [d. Chief Judge Wallace concluded that "[t]he word 'the' is important. Fail­
ure to· pay attention to it would allow any district court in the country to review the 
order of a magistrate judge with respect to a bail hearing. That, I suggest, makes no 
sense." Id. 
123. [d. 
124. Id. See supra note 35 for the pertinent text of Rule 40(a). 
125. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, C.J., concurring). 
126. [d. 
127. Id. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). 
128. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, C.J., concurring). 
129. [d. 
130. [d. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1994). 
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istrate judge must have a certain level of familiarity with the case.131 
The concurrence reasoned that the district in which the prosecution 
is pending is the proper district to review the magistrate judge's or­
der because it will have the requisite familiarity with the matter.132 
Finally, Chief Judge Wallace noted that the district court in the 
district of arrest could review the order of the magistrate judge, but 
only in a very limited situation.133 In a circumstance where the de­
fendant has waived trial in the district of prosecution, and where 
the waiver is approved by the United States attorney for both dis­
tricts, review would be appropriate in the district of arrest. l34 
3. Judge Noonan's Dissenting Opinion135 
In dissent, Judge Noonan first noted that section 3145 identifies 
a court that is "distinctly different" from the court identified by 
Federal Rule 40.136 The dissent stated that the language "the court 
having original jurisdiction" as used in section 3145 could mean any 
district court of the United States under section 3231.137 However, 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution limits the commence­
ment of prosecution to "the district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed."138 Thus, according to the dissent, section 3145 
refers to a specific district court with jurisdiction over the defend­
ant, but the challenge is determining which court that is.139 
The dissent determined that the court with jurisdiction over the 
131. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, C.J., concurring). See supra note 56 for the 
pertinent text of 18 U.S.c. § 3142(g). 
132. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, c.J., concurring). The concurring opinion 
cited to two cases-without discussion or elaboration-in support of its conclusion. Id. 
at 1239. The two cases are United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1991) and 
United States v. Acheson, 672 F. Supp. 577 (D.N.H. 1987). See infra notes 154-56 and 
267-72 and accompanying text for the facts and holdings of each case, respectively. 
133. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Wallace, c.J., concurring). 
134. Id. Chief Judge Wallace noted that the waiver could be effectuated by Rule 
20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. See supra notes 41-42 and accom­
panying text for a discussion of Rule 20. See also United States v. French, 7f!7 F.2d 
1381, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing Rule 20 and the prerequisites to transfer); 
United States v. Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342, 345-46 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 
913 (1951). 
135. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, 1., dissenting). 
136. Id. The dissent pointed out that § 3145 refers to "the court having original 
jurisdiction over the offense" while Rule 40 refers to "the district court in which prose­
cution is pending." 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1994); FED. R. CRIM. P. 40. See supra notes 35 
and 59-60 for the pertinent text of Rule 40 and § 3145, respectively. 
137. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See supra note 102 for the 
text of § 3231. 
138. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
139. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
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defendant is the district court in the district of arrest.140 Judge 
Noonan noted that Rule 40 does not address the issue because sub­
section (c) merely provides that the papers and bail will "go eventu­
ally to 'the clerk of the district court in which the prosecution is 
pending. '''141 
Moreover, the dissent urged that the factors of section 
3142(g)-applied in considering whether release of the defendant 
on bail is appropriate-favor review in the district of arrest.142 The 
dissent determined that: 
The great majority of these factors such as the person's "charac­
ter, family ties, employment, financial condition, length of resi­
dence, community ties" are best determined by the court in , 
which the person is apprehended if the person happens, as is 
the case here, to be a resident of the district in which appre­
hended.143 
Additionally, the dissent concluded that permitting review in the 
district court to which the magistrate is attached assures the 
promptness that is required by the United States Constitution and 
mandated by section 3145.144 The dissent argued that since the 
magistrate is housed, in most districts, in the same courthouse 
where the district court sits, access to the district court becomes 
physically facilitated and immediate.145 
Of particular importance to the dissent in its analysis was the 
nature of the relation between magistrate judges and Article III 
judges.146 The dissent asserted that "[t]he normal system of appel­
late review is territorial," thus, the ordinary procedure is that "[o]ne 
goes from a magistrate to the district court which has appointed the 
magistrate and then to the appellate court of the circuit in which the 
magistrate and district court exist."147 The dissent claimed that it 
was unlikely that Congress, in providing for review in section 3145, 
intended to abandon this normal "territorial hierarchy" in the man­
ner suggested by the majority.148 
140. Id. 
141. Id. (emphasis added). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(c). 
142. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See 18 U.S.c. § 3142(g) 
(1994). For the pertinent text of § 3142(g), see supra note 56. 
143. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 1239-40. 
146. Id. at 1240. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
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The dissent cited to the Supreme Court decision in United 
States v. Raddatz149 to emphasize that an analysis of the nature of 
the relationship between magistrate judges and Article III judges is 
criticaJ.150 The dissent considered Raddatz important because in 
that opinion "the Supreme Court declared: 'the entire process takes 
place under the district court's total control and jurisdiction. "'151 
The dissent also cited United States v. Gebro,152 which quoted 
the language in Raddatz as "relevant to the relationship between 
the district court and a magistrate judge ordering release on 
bail."153 In Gebro, the defendant appealed the decision of a district 
court judge to review "sua sponte"154 the magistrate judge's release 
order.155 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that the district court had the authority to review the magis­
149. 447 u.S. 667 (1980). 
150. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 
681). In Raddatz, the defendant appeared before a federal magistrate judge on a mo­
tion to suppress evidence. 447 U.S. at 669. The magistrate recommended to deny the 
motion and the defendant filed objections. Id. at 672. The district court accepted the 
magistrate's recommendation, denied the defendant's motion to suppress, imd sen­
tenced the defendant. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
reversed the district court's decision, finding that the defendant had been deprived of 
due process because the district court failed to hear the controverted testimony. Id. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the district court has plenary discretion 
whether to authorize a magistrate to hold an evidentiary hearing," and, thus, the district 
court in Raddatz did not deprive the defendant of due process by failing to hear the 
controverted testimony. Id. at 681. 
151. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (quoting Raddatz, 447 U.S. 
at 681). 
152. 948 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1991). 
153. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Gebro, 948 F.2d at 
1120). 
154. "Sua sponte" means "[o]f his ... own will or motion; voluntarily; without 
prompting or suggestion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990). 
155. Gebro, 948 F.2d at 1120. The defendant in Gebro was charged with aiding 
and abetting an armed bank robbery. [d. at 1119. The procedure challenged by the 
defendant in Gebro was actually the second "bite at the apple" for the Government. 
The defendant was originally charged and arrested for aiding and abetting a bank rob­
bery, ordered detained by a magistrate judge, and ultimately convicted and sentenced. 
[d. However, the conviction was reversed and remanded by the court of appeals due to 
improper jury instructions. [d. 
Because of a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, the district court dismissed the 
original indictment and a new one was filed. Id. at 1119 n.2. The defendant was 
brought before a magistrate judge and the government moved for pretrial detention. 
[d. at 1119. The magistrate judge denied the motion for pretrial detention, and ordered 
the defendant released on $25,000 bail. Id. At a trial setting hearing, the United States 
district court judge indicated that he thought that the defendant was a flight risk, and 
ordered a detention hearing. [d. At that detention hearing, the district court vacated 
the magistrate judge's release order and ordered the defendant detained. Id. at 1119~ 
20. 
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trate judge's order, stating that "'the entire process takes place 
under the district court's total control and jurisdiction. "'156 
The dissent in Evans recognized that Gebro was distinguish­
able from the principal case.157 However, the dissent contended 
that Gebro was the closest precedent, "incorporat[ing] the tradi­
tional understanding of the relationship of the magistrate judge to 
the district court that appointed the magistrate judge."158 The 
phrase "total control," the dissent argued, "suggests, even if it does 
not absolutely require, the proximity of the magistrate judge to the 
district court which is exercising control."159 Thus, the dissent con­
cluded that requiring a district court thousands of miles away to 
exercise "total control" over a magistrate judge who orders deten­
tion or release creates a strange and unusual result,160 This result is 
an improper increase in the magistrate judge's independence.161 In 
short, the dissent in Evans concluded that the defendant properly 
sought review of the magistrate judge's detention order in the dis­
trict of arrest.162 
III. ANALYSIS 
At issue in United States v. Evans is a determination of the 
proper interpretation of section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act of 
1984.163 The legislative history of this statute provides no guidance 
156. Id. at 1120 (quoting United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980». 
157. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting) ("At issue in Gebro was not 
our question, so Gebro may be distinguished."). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 1239-40. 
163. - See id. at 1235. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
recently had occasion to address preCisely the same issue faced by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Evans, on essentially the same facts, in" 
United States v. Torres, 86 F.3d 1029 (11th Cir. 1996). In a very brief one-page opinion, 
a majority of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that the plain 
language of 18 U.S.c. § 3145 dictates that, in a multi-district proceeding, the court with 
original jurisdiction over the offense is the district court in the prosecuting district. Id. 
at 1031. The Torres majority relied exclusively on the Ninth Circuit's majority opinion 
in Evans as the basis for its conclusion. Id. Judge Barkett dissented from the Torres 
majority opinion, finding Judge Noonan's dissent in Evans the more persuasive ap­
proach. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting). Neither the majority nor the dissent in Torres 
added any independent discussion, elaboration, or analysis to the issue raised under 
§ 3145. Instead, the majority and dissent adopted in full the reasoning of their respec­
tive Ninth Circuit counterparts. 
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in determining this issue.164 In fact, courts that have addressed vari­
ous issues arising out of multi-district proceedings have determined 
that in drafting section 3145, "[i]t does not appear that Congress 
gave any consideration to the problems that multi-district proceed­
ings would generate. "165 The Senate Report prepared in connec­
tion with the Bail Reform Act "seems only to contemplate 
proceedings within a single district."166 Consequently, guidance 
must be derived from other sources. The sources adopted in this 
Note for determining the proper interpretation of section 3145 in­
clude: a plain language analysis, the United States Constitution, 
Rules 5 and 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, selected 
sections within the Bail Reform Act of 1984, as well as case law. 
This section of the Note will discuss and analyze these sources and 
attempt to reconcile them with section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act 
of 1984. In doing so, this Note concludes that the phrase "the court 
having original jurisdiction over the offense" refers to the district 
court in the district of prosecution. 
A. 	 Plain Language of Section 3i45 of the Bail Reform Act of 
1984 
The Evans majority determined that the best starting point in 
ascertaining which district court is authorized to review the findings 
of the magistrate judge under section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act, 
especially in light of the absence of legislative intent, is an analysis 
of the statutory language itself.167 Section 3145 states that either 
164. See S. REp. No. 225, supra note 20, at 29-30, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 3212-13. 
165. United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 7fJ2, 704 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986). See gener­
ally S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182. 
166. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704 n.3. See also United States v. Melendez-Car­
rion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 1986) ("There is no indication that Congress ... consid­
ered the context of an arrest in a district other than the district of prosecution."); 
United States v. Velasco, 879 F. Supp. 377, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Dominguez, 783 
F.2d at 704 n.3); United States v. Acheson, 672 F. Supp. 577, 579 (D.N.H. 1987) (citing 
Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704 n.3.) ("As at least one court has aptly pointed out, it does 
not appear that Congress in adopting the Bail Reform Act, gave any consideration to 
the problems that multi-district proceedings would generate."). 
167. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1236-38 (9th Cir. 1995). For a compre­
hensive examination of the various theories behind statutory interpretation and con­
struction, see generally Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Use of Legislative History in 
Statutory Interpretation: A Look at Regents v. Bakke, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 57 
(1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Rea­
soning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice 
Scalia's Jurisprudence ofStrict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 401 
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the government or the defendant may seek review in "the court 
having original jurisdiction over the offense. "168 The Evans court 
initially focused on the use of the word "the" in the statute.169 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, federal district courts of the United States 
have original jurisdiction over federal offenses.170 In isolation, it 
may appear as though section 3231 extends original jurisdiction to 
all district courts of the United States.171 The Evans court, how­
ever, determined that the language of section 3145 limits the choice 
to one particular federal district court-"the" court with original 
jurisdiction over the offense.l72 The statute does not refer to "any" 
federal court or "all" federal courts, but limits review to "the" court 
with original jurisdiction. If Congress had intended for any or all 
federal district courts to have the authority to review the magistrate 
judge's orders, it may well have used that broad language in the text 
of section 3145. In the absence of that language, it is apparent that 
Congress intended to restrict the courts from which to choose to a 
single court. 
(1994); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Laws as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 
(1989); John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1373 (1992). See also Susan G. Fentin, Note, Finding Middle Ground Be­
tween Opportunity and Opportunism: The "Original Source" Provision of 31 V.S. C. 
§ 3730(e)(4) , 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 255,285-90 (1995); Jane Ellen Warner, Note, 
The Household Waste Exclusion Clarification; 42 V.S.c. Section 6921 (i): Did Congress 
Intend to Exclude Municipal Solid Waste Ash from Regulation as Hazardous Waste 
Under Subtitle C?, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 149, 167-75 (1994). 
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1994) (emphasis added). 
169. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. 
170. § 3231. See supra note 102 for the text of § 3231. Section 3231 has been 
considered a broad grant of jurisdiction. See Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236; United States v. 
Koloboski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1329-30 (7th Cir. 1984); Williams v. United States, 582 F.2d 
1039, 1040 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); United States v. Wiseman, 445 
F.2d 792, 797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 967 (1971); United States v. Sasscer, 558 F. 
Supp. 33, 36 (D. Md. 1982); United States v. Jackson, 374 F. Supp. 168, 173 (N.D. Ill. 
1974), affd in part and rev'd in part, 508 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1975). 
171. This was precisely the defendant's argument in Evans. The defendant main­
tained that § 3231 grants all district courts "original jurisdiction" over federal offenses, 
thus, any district court has the authority to review the magistrate judge's detention or­
der. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235-36. However, as the majority in Evans clarified, § 3231 
merely designates that federal courts, rather than state courts, have jurisdiction over 
federal offenses. Id. at 1236. The court stated that § 3231 does not specify exactly 
which court is "the court having original jurisdiction over the offense" as used in § 3145. 
Id. See supra notes 59 and 60 for the text of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3145(a) and (b) (1994), 
respectively. Section 3145 possesses a narrower meaning than the "broad grant of origi­
nal jurisdiction" conveyed in § 3231. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. . 
172. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. See § 3145(a), (b). There is no dispute among the 
Evans court that the language of § 3145 of the Bail Reform Act refers to a single fed­
eral district court. The dispute centers around which district court that is. See generally 
Evans, 62 F.3d at 1233-40. 
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Having determined that there is but one district court which is 
authorized to review the magistrate judge's detention or release or­
der, the majority in Evans asserted that the next step is to discern 
which court that is.173 Because review is limited by the word "the" 
to a single district court, it follows that there is only one district 
court with "original jurisdiction over the offense" for the purposes 
of detention or release decision review. In the multi-district con­
text, however, there are two federal district courts with an arguable 
interest in the determination of the defendant's detention or re­
lease-the district court in the district of arrest and the district 
court in the charging district. The majority in Evans concluded that 
an analysis of the term "original jurisdiction" of section 3145 in 
light of the constitutional restrictions on where a trial can be held 
helps in determining which court is the proper district court for 
review.174 
B. 	 Constitutional Guarantee of Venue: Determining Where the 
Case can "Originally" be Brought 
Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution and the 
Sixth Amendment require the prosecution of federal crimes in the 
district where the crimes were committed unless waived by the de­
fendant. 175 The defendant can seek a dismissal of the prosecution 
unless it is brought in that district,176 Since waiver can be effectu­
ated, this is technically a matter of venue rather than jurisdiction. 177 
However, until the defendant waives the right, the court that pos­
sesses "original jurisdiction over the offense" is the court in the 
"district wherein the crime shall have been committed."178 
The dissent in Evans placed little emphasis on the effect of 
these constitutional provisions.179 The dissent conceded that the 
broad grant of jurisdiction of section 3231 is limited by the Sixth 
173. 	 Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. 
174. 	 Id. 
175. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See supra notes 71 
and 72 and accompanying text for the pertinent language of Article III, Section 2, 
Clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment, and for a discussion of the distinction between the 
two provisions. 
176. 	 Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. 
177. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text discussing the distinction be­
tween the concepts of venue and jurisdiction. 
178. 	 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI .. 
179. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). Judge Noonan never actu­
ally mentioned Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution in his dissent, 
although he did make reference to the Sixth Amendment. Id. 
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Amendment to prosecution in the district where the crime was 
committed.180 However, the dissent suggested that this did not aid 
in answering the. question, but really constituted the question it­
self.181 Judge Noonan maintained that the Sixth Amendment only 
helps in determining that section 3231 does not grant all district 
courts jurisdiction to hear the case.182 
Emphasizing that the constitutional requirement was not "ju­
risdictional," the dissent concluded that it was, more properly char­
acterized as a venue requirement, which can be waived by the 
defendant.183 Thus, although the Sixth Amendment requires trial 
in the district where the offense was committed, the "usual rules 
governing venue and jurisdiction" render the Sixth Amendment 
"requirement" ambiguous for the purpose of determining which 
district court has the authority to review under section 3145.184 
One of the "usual rules" referred to by the dissent is doubt­
lessly Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.185 Rule 
20 accords the defendant the right to waive trial in the district of 
prosecution and allow the district of arrest to hear the case.186 
However, a defendant seeking to transfer under this provision does 
not receive an "automatic" transfer.187 The transfer is subject to 
the approval of the prosecuting attorneys for both the arresting and 
charging districts.188 Consequently, it is apparent that the district 
court in the district of arrest is without the authority to hear and try 
the case absent consent by the government attorneys for both 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. Thus, the dissent argued that the Sixth Amendment does not answer the 
question of which district court has authority to review the magistrate judge's orders. 
Id. The dissent urged that the Sixth Amendment merely provides that no district court 
could be chosen at random to hear the review of a magistrate judge's detention order. 
183. Id. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text discussing the distinction 
between jurisdiction and venue. 
184. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST. amend VI 
("right tei ... trial[ ] by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed"). 
185. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20. 
186. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20(a). The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules 
state that "[t]his rule would accord to a defendant ... an opportunity to secure disposi­
tion of the case in the district where the arrest takes place, thereby relieving him of 
whatever hardship may be involved in a removal to the place where the prosecution is 
pending." FED. R. CruM. P. 20 advisory committee's note. 
187. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20(a). 
188. Id. See supra note 41 for the pertinent language of Federal Rule 20(a). The 
requirement of approval by both United States attorneys is intended to control the 
danger of forum shopping by the defendant. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20 advisory committee's 
note. 
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districts.189 
In contrast to the dissent, the majority in Evans placed its em­
phasis on the constitutional requirement that prosecution could be 
"originally" brought only in the federal district court of the district 
where the crime was alleged to have been committed.190 Because 
the Constitution mandates that the defendant shall be accorded 
trial in the district where the crime was committed-Le., the district 
of prosecution-the district court in that district is the only tribunal 
with true "original" jurisdiction over theoffense.191 The term 
"original jurisdiction" refers to the "fj]urisdiction of [a] court to 
take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it, and pass judgment 
upon the law and facts. "192 The district court in the charging dis­
trict is the only court with the ability to take cognizance of the case 
at its inception.193 Accordingly, the district court in the charging 
district is the only court with "original jurisdiction. "194 
It is evident that this rationale is proper when analyzed under 
the notion that there is a single district court with "original jurisdic­
tion over the offense."195 Additionally, although the district of 
arrest may obtain jurisdiction over the defendant, it may do so only 
in a circumstance where the defendant has waived his right to be 
tried in accordance with the Constitution.196 This does not consti­
tute "original jurisdiction" as that term is used in the review provi­
sion of the Bail Reform Act.197 Thus, under the language of section 
3145, "the court having original jurisdiction," in the context of a 
multi-district proceeding, refers to the district court in the district 
where the crime was committed. 
189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20(a). 
190. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1995). 
191. See discussion supra part I.C. 
192. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). 
193. The district court in the district of arrest can take cognizance of the case only 
in the event of an approved waiver. This is not cognizance at its "inception." 
194. See United States v. Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808, 813 (8th Cir. 1986) (Addressing 
section 3146(e) of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (repealed 1984): "[T]he magistrate ... 
of the court which has original jurisdiction over the offense charged [the district court in 
the charging district] has the authority to amend conditions of release previously set in 
another district by another magistrate."); United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886, 890 
(11th Cir. 1982) (district judge in the charging district "had authority as the court with 
original jurisdiction over the case to amend the conditions of appellants' release"); 
United States v. Zuccaro, 645 F.2d 104, 105 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (referring to district 
court in the charging district as the court with original jurisdiction over the offense), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981). 
195. See discussion supra part III.A. 
196. See discussion supra part I.e. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 20. 
197. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1994). 
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C. Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Federal Rule 40 is the procedural starting point in a multi-dis­
trict case such as Evans. In addition, an examination of the lan­
guage of the Rule itself provides some insight into determining 
which court is authorized to review the magistrate judge's order 
under section 3145.198 Rule 40 provides further support for the 
conclusion that the distriCt court in the prosecuting district is the 
proper tribunal for review. 
1. Rule 40(a) 
To ensure that there will be no "unnecessary delay," Rule 
40(a) requires a defendant to be brought before the nearest avail­
able magistrate judge for a pretrial determination of bai1.199 How­
ever, the defendant can waive this requirement.2oo Rule 40(a) 
grants the defendant the right to "elect[] to have the preliminary 
examination conducted in the district in which the prosecution is 
pending."201 This right of election supports the conclusion that the 
district court in the charging district is the only properly authorized 
tribunal to review the magistrate judge's orders in two ways. First, 
it shows that the role of the magistrate judge, before whom the de­
fendant first appears in the district of arrest, is a limited one. The 
defendant is able to circumvent the magistrate judge in the district 
of arrest to have the detention hearing conducted in the charging 
district if he so chooses.202 That the role of the magistrate judge in 
the district of arrest is limited in such a manner lends support to the 
conclusion that the charging district should take over as soon as 
possible.203 More importantly, the right of election indicates that 
198. The majority and concurrence in Evans consulted Rule 40 in helping to as­
certain the proper interpretation of § 3145 of the Bail Reform Act. See United States v. 
Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1235-39 (9th Cir. 1995). 
199. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(a). See supra note 36 discussing the purpose behind the 
"no unnecessary delay" requirement of Rule 4O(a), and the relation of Rule 4O(a) to 
Rules 5 and 5.1. 
200. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). 
201. Id. The Advisory Committee's Note to the 1979 amendment of Rule 40(a) 
states: "A defendant might wish to elect that alternative when, for example, the law in 
that district is that the complainant and other material witnesses may be required to 
appear at the preliminary examination and give testimony." FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(a) 
advisory committee's note. 
202. See the election right provision of FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(a). 
203. If the charging district should take over as soon as possible, the inference is 
that the charging district should also be the district to review the orders of the magis­
trate. See United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wallace, c.J., 
concurring). 
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the Federal Rules favor prompt review of detention orders over 
prompt determinations of detention or release.204 If the defendant 
elects to have the detention hearing conducted in the district of 
prosecution, it is clear that more of a delay will ensue than if the 
defendant had not exercised the right. From these conclusions 
flows the inference that review is appropriate only in the charging 
district. This inference is further bolstered by analyzing the pecu­
liar results that follow if the district court in the district of arrest is 
authorized to review the magistrate judge's determination of deten­
tion or release. 
In a multi-district case, the defendant must appear before the 
nearest magistrate judge in the district of arrest for the "preliminary 
proceedings.''205 Under Rule 4O(a), the defendant is entitled to 
elect to have the detention hearing conducted in the charging dis­
triCt.206 A defendant who chooses to exercise that right must then 
be transferred to the charging district for the detention hearing.207 
In the event the orders issued by the magistrate judge are disputed 
by either the government or the defendant, sections 3145(a) and (b) 
of the Bail Reform Act allow either party to file a motion for re­
view.208 Requiring the motion for review to be filed with the dis­
trict court in the district of arrest would compel a transfer of the 
defendant back to the arresting district.209 This result is untenable 
for two reasons. First, it contravenes the mandate of section 3145 
of the Bail Reform Act that motions for review "shall be deter­
204. The concurrence in Evans determined that the defendant's "right of election 
indicates that the fundamental purpose of having the preliminary examination con­
ducted by the nearest available magistrate judge is to ensure that the defendant is not 
prevented from obtaining prompt review ofhis detention." Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wal­
lace, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). This language illustrates a dual purpose be­
hind the requirement of the appearance of the defendant before the nearest available 
magistrate judge. The first purpose is to protect the defendant from prejudicial delay. 
See supra note 36. The second is to ensure the defendant prompt review of his deten­
tion. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, C.J., concurring). See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) 
(1994) ("The motion [for revocation or amendment of the conditions of the detention 
order] shall be determined promptly."). 
205. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5. 
206. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). 

2m. Id. 

208. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1994). 
209. See discussion supra part III.A reaching the conclusion that there is one­
and only one-district court with the authority to review the magistrate judge's orders. 
Either the district court in the arresting district or the district court in the charging 
district has the authority to review, but not both. Consequently, there cannot be a 
flexible determination, on a case by case basis, of the proper district court for review 
depending on where the defendant chooses to have the detention hearing conducted. 
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mined promptly."210 Second, Federal Rule 40(a) requires the de­
fendant to ultimately answer for the alleged offenses in the charging 
district.211 This would necessitate a third transfer of the defend­
ant-from the district of arrest back to the charging district for trial. 
In order to avoid multiple transfers of the defendant and un­
due delay of this kind in the review of detention, the district court 
in the charging district must be the proper tribunal to review the 
orders of the magistrate judge. Adherence to this conclusion avoids 
this problematic scenario and leads to consistency in pretrial 
procedure.212 
2. Rule 40(c) 
Federal Rule 40(c) also strongly supports the position that the 
proper court to review the magistrate judge's order is the district 
court in which prosecution is pending. Rule 40(c) provides that af­
ter the detention hearing is conducted and a determination of de­
tention or release is reached, "the papers in the proceeding and any 
bail taken shall be transmitted to the clerk of the district court in 
which prosecution is pending."213 It would be illogical to require 
the papers and bail to be forwarded to the district in which prosecu­
tion is pending if review was to be conducted in the district of 
arrest.214 Thus, Rule 40(c) illustrates the proper contemplation of 
review in the district of prosecution in a multi-district proceeding. 
The dissent in Evans, however, disregarded the inconsistencies 
that would seemingly arise in concluding that the proper district 
court to review is the district of arrest.215 The dissent urged that 
210. § 3145(a), (b). 
211. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). 
212. To illustrate the ensuing consistency in procedure. if the defendant decides 
not to exercise the election right under Rule 4O(a), the pretrial bail determination oc­
curs promptly in the arresting district. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). The review then takes 
place in the charging district, where the trial is req~ired to be conducted under Rule 
4O(a). [d. On the other hand, if the defendant chooses to exercise the right of election, 
substantially the same procedure results. The defendant receives the prompt appear­
ance before the magistrate judge in the arresting district. The only change is that the 
detention hearing is conducted in the charging district, the same district where the re­
view and trial are to be conducted. This procedure averts any unwarranted delay and 
avoids subjecting the defendant to as many as three transfers between the arresting 
district and charging district. 
213. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(c). The full text of Rule 4O(c) states: "If a defendant is 
held or discharged, the papers in the proceeding and any bail taken shall be transmitted 
to the clerk of the district court in which the prosecution is pending." FED. R. CRIM. P. 
4O(c). . 
214. See United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 1995). 
215. [d. at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
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Rule 40(c) does not necessarily specify that the papers and bail 
must go to the district court in which prosecution is pending for 
review.216 Rather, the papers and bail merely need to "eventually" 
reach the charging district.217 The dissent concluded that once the 
issue of detention or release is resolved-either by the magistrate 
judge or by the district court on review-the papers are to be trans­
ferred at that point.218 
The dissent's reasoning, however, fails to fully consider the im­
plications of this interpretation of Rule 40(c). In light of the plain 
language of section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act,219 the principles 
underlying the applicable constitutional provisions,22o and the elec­
tion right provision contained within Rule 4O(a),221 a reasonable in­
terpretation of the language is that the papers and bail are to be 
sent immediately following the magistrate judge's determination of 
detention or release.222 The conclusion of immediate transfer logi­
cally flows from an adherence to the notion of procedural consis­
tency. As previously illustrated, any other interpretation leads to 
inconsistent and anomalous results-an outcome surely not in­
tended by Congress. 
An alternative approach to undermining the.dissent's reason­
ing with regard to Rule 40(c) is to construe the requirement of the 
transfer of the papers and bail as a limitation on the role of the 
magistrate judge in the arresting district.223 The dissent reasoned 
that Rule 4O(c) is ambiguous because it does not specify exactly at 
what point the papers and bail are to be transferred.224 However, 
216. [d. 
217. [d. 
218. [d. The dissent stated that Rule 40(c) fails to address the issue because the 
"Rule does not determine whether the district court which has appointed the magistrate 
shall first have reviewed the decision." Id. 
219. See discussion supra part III.A. 
220. See discussion supra part III.B. 
221. See discussion supra part III.C.l. 
222. The papers and bail should be sent immediately as opposed to "eventually" 
as suggested by the dissent in Evans. See Evans. 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan. J .• 
dissenting). 
223. The approach adopted by the dissent in Evans expands the role of the arrest­
ing district by requiring the detention hearing as well as review to be conducted in the 
arresting district. Id. The approach endorsed by the majority and concurrence, how­
ever. effectively limits the role of the arresting district to, at most. the pretrial determi­
nation of detention or release by the magistrate judge. [d. at 1236-39. 
224. Id. at 1239 (Noonan. J., dissenting). See supra notes 215-18 and accompany­
ing text. The ambiguous language, as contended by the dissent, consists of the first part 
of Rule 4O(c) which states: "If a defendant is held or discharged ...." FED. R. CRIM. P. 
4O(c). 
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an analysis of other subdivisions within Rule 40 reveals that the lan­
guage is not as unclear as the dissent asserts.225 
For example, subdivision (a) of Rule 40 addresses the appear­
ance of the defendant before the magistrate judge.226 Subdivision 
(b) addresses the required statement to the defendant by the magis
trate judge regarding the provisions of Federal Rule 20.227 These 
observations are noteworthy because the subdivisions only address 
activities concerning the magistrate judge, not the. district court 
judge who conducts review.228 Moreover, Rule 40 makes no refer­
ence at all to review of the magistrate judge's pretrial bail determi­
nation.229 Therefore, it seems that Rule 40(c) is not ambiguous, 
but, rather, quite clear that its application is limited to the detention 
or discharge of the defendant by the magistrate judge. The conclu­
sion of the dissent in Evans improperly broadens the scope of the 
Rule 40( c) transfer of papers and bail to apply to detention or re­
lease decisions by the magistrate judge and by the district court 
judge in the district of arrest. Nothing in the language of the Rule 
suggests such a construction. The foregoing analysis clarifies· that 
the magistrate judge's role in the proceedings is a limited one, and 
that pursuant to Rule 40( c) the prosecuting district should take over 
as soon as possible. 
D. 	 "Requisite Familiarity" Requirement of Section 3142(g) of the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984 
Section 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was employed 
by both the concurrence230 and dissent231 in Evans to support each 
opinion's determination of the appropriate interpretation of section 
3145.232 This subsection of the Note analyzes how each opinion ap­
225. 	 See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 40. 
226. 	 FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(a). 
227. 	 FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(b). 
228. All of the subdivisions of Rule 40 address the procedures to be followed by 
the magistrate judge in the district of arrest in a multi-district case. See generally FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 40. None of the subdivisions indicate contemplation of application or rela­
tion to the district judge who conducts review at the district court level. 
229. Review of pretrial bail determinations is specifically provided for in § 3145 
of the Bail Reform Act. 18 U.S.c. § 3145 (1994). Rule 40 does not address detention 
or release of the defendant-it is merely concerned with the pretrial criminal procedure 
in the multi-district context. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 40. 
230. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wallace, c.J., 
concurring). 
231. 	 Id. at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
232. 	 See 18 U.S.c. § 3142(g) (1994). Section 3142(g) requires the magistrate 
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proached section 3142(g), how other courts have interpreted the 
provision, and how to resolve the interpretive problem. 
Section 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 presents the 
factors to be considered by the judicial officer in reaching a deter­
mination of whether to release a defendant on bail.233 Some of the 
factors sweep rather broadly234 while others require a more per­
sonal, knowledgeable assessment of the defendant.235 Section 
3142(g)(3) mandates that the judicial officer shall take into account 
the available information concerning personal factors including: the 
person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, em­
ployment, financial resources, length of residence in the commu­
nity, and community ties.236 Sections 3142(g)(1) and (2) require the 
judicial officer to consider the nature and circumstances of the of­
fense and the weight of the evidence against the person.237 Because 
review of a magistrate judge's orders by the district court is de 
novo, consideration of these factors arises again on review under 
section 3145.238 
The factors required to be considered by the judicial officer 
generate two approaches to the determination of the appropriate 
tribunal for review. Under the first approach, the focus centers on 
the judicial officer's familiarity with the nature and circumstances of 
the offense as required by section 3142(g)(1),239 and the weight of 
the evidence against the person under subsection (g)(2).240 Propo­
nents of this approach conclude that the proper district court to re­
view the pretrial bail decision is the district court in the charging 
district because that district is best able to review with the proper 
knowledge and background mandated by section 3142(g).241 
judge to take into consideration many factors concerning the defendant and the alleged 
crime. See supra note 56 for the pertinent text of § 3142(g). 
233. § 3142(g). 
234. See § 3142(g)(I), (2). 
235. See § 3142(g)(3)(A). 
236. Id. 
237. § 3142(g)(I), (2). 
238. "[T]he district court judge may begin anew and simply follow the procedures 
set out in [the Bail Reform] Act [§]3142." Pringle, supra note 63, at 922. See generally 
United States v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1991). See also supra notes 63-66 and 
accompanying text discussing the district court's de novo standard of review. 
239. See § 3142(g)(I). 
240. See § 3142(g)(2). 
241. The approach that the district court in the district of prosecution is the 
proper tribunal to review the determination of bail is the approach adopted by the 
concurring opinion in Evans. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(Wallace, C.J., concurring). This approach receives support from both the Second and 
Seventh Circuits. See United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 
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The second approach focuses on the judicial officer's familiar­
ity with the history and personal characteristics of the defendant 
pursuant to section 3142(g)(3).242 Advocates of this approach con­
clude that the pretrial bail decision of the magistrate judge is prop­
erly reviewed by the district court in the district of arrest.243 The 
basis for this conclusion is that when a defendant is arrested in the 
district in which he resides, that district possesses the requisite fa­
miliarity under section 3142(g).244 . 
1. Requisite Familiarity in the District of Prosecution 
Two federal courts of appeals decisions that have addressed the 
issue of which court has the requisite familiarity with a particular de­
fendant and the defendant's case are United States v. Dominguez 245 
1986) (holding that the evidence necessary to make the detennination of whether to 
release or detain the defendant will be located primarily in the district where prosecu­
tion is pending); United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that the most infonned decisions concerning release or detention will be made 
by the prosecutors and courts in the district where prosecution is pending). See also 
United States v. Velasco, 879 F. Supp. 377, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the most 
infonned decisions concerning bail or release will be made in the district where prose­
cution is pending); United States v. Jones, 804 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (S.D. Ind. 1992) 
(holding that the Bail Refonn Act "recognizes a 'local' interest in the originating juris­
diction which may be different than the interests of the jurisdiction in which the arrest 
occurs"). 
242. See § 3142(g)(3). 
243. The approach that the arresting district is the proper district to review is the 
approach adopted by the dissent in Evans. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissent­
ing). Several district courts lend support to this approach. See, e.g., United States v. 
Johnson, 858 F. Supp. 119, 122 (N.D. Ind. 1994); United States v. Acheson, 672 F. Supp. 
577,579 (D.N.H. 1987). 
244. See Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting); Johnson, 858 F. Supp. at 
122 (holding that a magistrate judge in the charging district has no authority to review 
an order denying detention issued by another magistrate judge in the arresting district); 
Acheson, 672 F. Supp. at 579 (stating that "[ilt is difficult to ascertain how ... personal 
history and ties to the community can be developed unless by hearing before the judi­
cial officer in the community in which the defendant has resided," which is where the 
defendant was arrested, but holding that the district court in the district of arrest had no 
authority to set aside an ex parte order issued by a magistrate in the district of 
prosecution). 
245. 783 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986). In Dominguez, the defendants were indicted in 
the Northern District of Indiana on drug-trafficking charges and were arrested in Flor­
ida where they appeared before a federal magistrate judge. Id. at 703. The magistrate 
judge set the defendants' bond at one million dollars. Id. After removal proceedings in 
Florida, the defendants were transported to Indiana. Id. At the defendants' first ap­
pearance in Indiana, the government moved for a pretrial hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3142(e). Id. See supra note 50 and accompanying text discussing § 3142(f). At the 
hearing, the defendants were ordered detained. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 703. 
The defendants filed motions for revocation of the magistrate judge's detention 
order with the district judge in Indiana and the district judge revoked the order. Id. 
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and United States v. Melendez-Carrion.246 In Dominguez, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, in 
a removal proceeding, a detention hearing should not be conducted 
in the arresting district.247 A detention hearing in the arresting dis­
trict would place the bail decision in the hands of persons much less 
concerned about the ultimate outcome of the proceedings.248 The 
court of appeals concluded that the district of arrest is less likely to 
possess the requisite knowledge of the defendant and of the charges 
against him to make an informed decision regarding detention or 
release.249 
However, the district judge then conducted a de novo hearing on a motion by the de­
fendants to modify the Florida bond, at which the district judge ordered the defendants 
detained. Id. 
The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. Id. They argued that the district court judge did not have the authority to 
detain them because the government had waived its right to pretrial detention by not 
raising it at the defendants' first appearance before the magistrate judge in Florida. Id. 
at 704. The court of appeals rejected the defendants' claim and held that the motion for 
detention in the charging district was timely. Id. at 705. 
246. 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986). The case is a consolidation of the appeals of 
eight individuals. The defendants were indicted in the district of Connecticut. Id. at 
988. Seven of the defendants were arrested in Puerto Rico and the eighth was arrested 
in Dallas, Texas. Id. The defendants were brought before the federal magistrate judge 
in their respective arresting districts, but the cases were removed to the charging district 
before a detention hearing was conducted. Id. at 989. Consequently, the detention 
hearings were conducted before the federal magistrate judge in Connecticut. Id. 
The magistrate judge ordered six of the eight defendants detained and the remain­
ing two released on bail. Id. at 990. The government sought review of the two release 
orders in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, and the dis­
trict court judge reversed the release orders and ordered the remaining two defendants 
detained. Id. 
On appeal, the defendants raised procedural challenges to the detention and re­
moval proceedings, arguing that a removal proceeding may not precede the detention 
hearing. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the 
removal proceedings could precede the detention hearing, relying on Dominguez. Jd. 
See Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704-05. 
247. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704. 
248. Id. 
249. Jd. The court also recognized that if prosecutors in the arresting district 
were required to seek detention at the first appearance of defendants, they would often 
rely on "automatic" requests for continuances to obtain the relevant information from 
the charging district, which would possibly result in unnecessarily extended detention. 
Id. The court conceded that there is support in the legislative history of the Bail Re­
form Act that "automatic" continuances are available to the government to help facili­
tate preparation for detention hearings, but that they should not be used in a 
"wholesale fashion" by courts or prosecutors. Jd. at 704-05. See S, REp. No. 225, supra 
note 20, at 21-22, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3204-05. The court noted, however, 
that "[i]t does not appear that Congress gave any consideration to the problems that 
multi-district proceedings would generate," and that "[t]he [Senate] Report seems only 
to contemplate proceedings within a single district." Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704 n.3. 
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The court.supported its position by analyzing section 3142(g) 
of the Bail Reform Act.250 The court stated that in light of sections 
3142(g)(1) and (2), the best assessment of the nature of the charged 
offense and weight of evidence against the defendant "will most as­
suredly be available" in the district of prosecution.251 
In a similar situation to Dominguez, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Melendez-Carrion, stated thaht 
was very unlikely that Congress would have intended detention 
hearings to occur in districts "scattered across the country in which 
those accused . . . might happen to be arrested. "252 Furthermore, 
the court concluded that the "decision whether to seek detention 
and the evidence necessary to support a finding of dangerousness 
and risk of flight sufficient to justify detention will normally be lo­
cated primarily in the district of prosecution."253 
However, the Second Circuit recognized that there may be cir­
cumstances in which pertinent evidence may also be located in the 
arresting district.254 The court noted that if the defendant is a resi­
dent of the district of arrest, he can be afforded protection from 
inaccessibility to evidence that may be beneficial or relevant to the 
defendant's case.255 If the evidence of certain personal factors that 
a defendant may wish to present can be reasonably obtained only in 
the district of arrest, the court suggested that the defendant should 
be given the opportunity to present such evidence.256 Presumably, 
the locally available evidence--concerning the defendant's "roots" 
in the community or other factors-would be presented to the mag­
istrate judge in a preliminary hearing.257 This heariilg, however, 
250. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 705. 
251. Id. at 705. The court concluded that in light of the factors to be considered 
under § 3142(g)(1) and (2), "the most informed decisions will almost always be made in 
the charging district by prosecutors that have supervised the investigations and by 
courts that will supervise the remaining proceedings." Id. The court further stated that 
"[ilt makes no sense to mandate in multi-district situations that ... procedures be con­
ducted in the district court with the lesser interest in the defendant and less complete 
knowledge of his case." Id. 
Dominguez also went on to address the defendants' substantive challenges to the 
district judge's determination of dangerousness under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Those issues 
are not raised in United States v. Evans and are beyond the scope of this Note. 
252. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 1986). 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. See infra notes 276-91 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion 
of the Second Circuit's approach in Melendez-Carrion concerning the defendant's op­
portunity to present evidence. 
257. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. 
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would not constitute a "detention hearing" in the district of 
arrest.258 The record of that proceeding would then be transferred 
to the district of prosecution for the actual detention hearing.259 
In light of these two appellate decisions, it is evident that the 
district court in the charging district is the proper tribunal to review 
the detention or release order issued by the magistrate judge in the 
district of arrest. The district of prosecution will arguably have· 
more familiarity with the nature and circumstances of the offense 
charged.260 In a situation where evidence of the personal character­
istics of the defendant is important, the prosecuting district will also 
have access to that evidence. Under the de novo standard of re­
view, the considerations of section 3142(g) in determining detention 
or release again become controlling for the district court judge. 
2. Requisite Familiarity in the District of Arrest 
The dissent in Evans argued that, in certain circumstances, the 
district court in the district of arrest will have the requisite familiar­
ity with the defendant to make the determination of whether to re­
lease the defendant back into the community.261 The dissent 
asserted that the factors to be considered on review under section 
3142(g) "are best determined by the court in which the person is 
apprehended if the person happens ... to be a resident of the dis­
trict in which apprehended. "262 
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the 
dissent's conclusion only contemplates which district court is appro­
priate for review if the defendant resides in the arresting district. 
The next logical question, which the dissent's approach fails to con­
sider, is: Which district court is appropriate for review if the defend­
ant does not reside in the arresting district? The dissent's approach, 
in effect, addresses only half of the question. 
Moreover, the conclusion reached by the dissent is illogical in a 
situation where the defendant does not reside in, or have any ties 
to, the arresting district. There is no rational reason t~ require the 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. See United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wallace, c.J., 
concurring); United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1986); 
Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. See also United States v. Velasco, 879 F. Supp. 377, 
378 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Jones, 804 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (S.D. Ind. 1992). 
261. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3142(g)(3)(A) (1994). See also supra note 56 for the pertinent text of § 3142(g). 
262. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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filing of a motion for review in the arresting district in a situation 
where the defendant has no ties to that district. Nevertheless, the 
dIssent's approach concludes that the tribunal authorized to hear 
the motion for review under section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act is 
the district court in the district of arrest.263 
The dissent in Evans also asserted that "Congress may well 
have supposed that [the scenario in which the defendant is arrested 
in the district of residence] was the more common one and that 
therefore the district of arrest should be the district to determine 
bail. "264 It is possible that Congress "may well have" contemplated 
that the scenario in which the defendant is arrested in the district 
where he resides is the more common scenario. However, Congress 
has provided no guidance on this point.265 Additionally, at least 
one commentator has stated that "people today are far more likely 
to commit crimes outside their district of residence than they once 
were."266 It is equally as possible that people are more commonly 
arrested outside of their district of residence than within. Thus, 
Congress may well have contemplated that the more common sce­
nario is one in which the defendant is arrested in a district in which 
he does not reside. In any event, it seems that the Evans dissent 
has tailored, indeed manufactured, congressional intent to fit its 
conclusion, rather than tailor its conclusion to fit congressional 
intent. 
The dissent's view appears at first blush to receive some sup­
port from United States v. Acheson.267 In Acheson, the district 
court judge in the district of arrest held that he did not have juris­
diction to set aside an ex parte order of detention issued by the 
263. Id. at 1239-40. See § 3145(a), (b). See supra notes 59 and 60 for the perti­
nent text of § 3145(a) and (b), respectively. 
264. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
265. See generally S. REp. No. 225, supra note 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182. 
266. Note, supra note 72, at 107 n.89 (discussing the erosion of certain policy 
justifications behind the concept of venue). 
267. 672 F. Supp. 577 (D.N.H. 1987). In Acheson, the defendant was indicted by 
the grand jury in the District of Nevada and arrested in New Hampshire, his state of 
residence. Id. at 578. The defendant was brought before a federal magistrate judge in 
New Hampshire and the government moved for a pretrial detention hearing. Id. The 
magistrate judge admitted the defendant to bail and the government sought review of 
the release order in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. Id. at 
577-78. The district court judge in Nevada issued an ex parte order staying the order by 
the New Hampshire magistrate judge admitting the defendant to bail. Id. at 577. The 
defendant appealed that decision to the United States District Court for the District of 
New Hampshire. Id. at 580. 
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district court judge in the district of prosecution.268 In dicta, how­
ever, the judge noted that the personal history of the defendant is 
best evaluated in a hearing before the magistrate judge in the com­
munity in which the defendant resides.269 
The dicta in Acheson supports the approach that the requisite 
familiarity of the defendant under 3142(g) lies with the district of 
arrest.270 However, the actual decision of the district court illus­
trates that this approach holds little weight. The district judge in 
Acheson recognized that review was properly sought in the district 
court in the charging district because only that district court had 
"original jurisdiction over the offense."271 Accordingly, the district 
court judge in Acheson held that the district court in the arresting 
district had no authority to set aside the charging district's ex parte 
order of detention.272 
The dissent in Evans specifically based its conclusion on the 
fact that the personal factors of section 3142(g)(3) are best consid­
ered by the arresting district.273 This conclusion, however, receives 
little valuable support and leads to inconsistencies in federal crimi­
nalpretrial procedure. 
3. Reconciliation of the Competing Views 
Under section 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act, the factors con­
sidered in determining whether to release or detain a defendant en­
compass a full range of inquiry-from general knowledge of the 
defendant and the surrounding circumstances to intricate personal 
details.274 In essence, section 3142(g) involves a balancing test in 
268. Id. 
269. Id. at 579. The judge recognized this as such "at least in cases where, as 
here, such residence has been continuous for a period of approximately three and one­
half years." Id. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. (quoting United States v. Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808, 815 (8th Cir. 1986». In 
Spilotro, the court held that, in a multi-district proceeding, sua sponte review of an out­
of-district magistrate judge's conditions of release was appropriate. The court stated: 
We ... hold that § 3146(e) [now repealed] granted the court with original 
jurisdiction over the offense charged the authority to amend sua sponte and at 
any time the conditions of release. To hold otherwise would sharply restrict 
the discretion of the trial court to determine pretrial matters. In addition, re­
quiring a remand of the case to the releasing judicial officer in order to amend 
conditions of release would waste limited judicial resources. 
Spilotro, 786 F.2d at 815. 
272. Acheson, 672 F. Supp. at 580. 
273. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 1995). See 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3142(g)(3) (1994). 
274. § 3142(g). See supra note 56 for the pertinent text of § 3142(g). 
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which the key is to weigh the various factors to determine whether 
the defendant is a risk of flight or a danger to the community.275 
The outcome of the determination depends on the evidence and 
information adduced before the magistrate judge at the detention 
hearing or the district judge on review. The challenge faced here is 
to determine which district is best able to gain access to and evalu­
ate that evidence and information. 
The approach set out by the Second Circuit in Melendez-Car­
rion elucidates the proper procedural solution.276 Under the Sec­
ond Circuit's approach, it is reasonable to conclude that review in a 
multi-district proceeding is properly sought only in the district court 
in the charging district pursuant to section 3145.277 The charging 
district is the district which issues the indictment and warrant, and 
the prosecutors who have conducted the appropriate investigations 
are located there.278 Therefore, on review, the district of prosecu­
tion is normally the district best able to make the determination of 
whether the defendant is a danger to the community or a risk of 
flight. 279 
However, situations may arise in which the defendant wishes to 
introduce evidence of personal factors to counter the government's 
evidence favoring detention.280 This evidence may only be avail­
able in the district of arrest,when that coincides with the defend­
ant's place of residence. In such a situation, the Melendez-Carrion 
court has stated: 
Where practical, consideration should be given to affording the 
defendant, arrested in his district of residence, an opportunity in 
that district promptly to present locally available evidence perti­
nent to the issue of pretrial release so that a transcript of such 
evidence can be prepared and furnished to the judicial officer 
275. § 3142(g). 
276. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 1986). See 
supra notes 246 and 252-59 and accompanying text for the facts and holding of 
Melendez-Carrion. 
277. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. See 18 U.S.c. § 3142(f) (1994). which provides that a detention hearing 
shall be held to "reasonably assure the appearance of [aJ person as required and the 
safety of any other person and the community." See supra note 50 for the pertinent 
text of § 3142(f). 
280. These situations arise when the government introduces evidence showing 
that the defendant is a danger to the community or a risk of flight and should be de­
tained. § 3142(f). See also § 3142(g). The defendant may have access to rebutting evi­
dence to show that the factors of § 3142(g) weigh in his favor. See supra note 56 for the . 
pertinent text of § 3142(g). 
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making the detention decision in the district of prosecution.281 
This approach, as set out in Melendez-Carrion, is consistent 
with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984. The Federal Rules require the defendant to be 
brought in an "initial appearance" before the nearest federal magis­
trate judge.282 Under the Bail Reform Act, a detention hearing is 
to be held upon the defendant's "first appearance" before the judi­
cial officer.283 Although these two requirements appear to be 
eq~ivalent, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir­
cuit, in Dominguez, held that they should not be interpreted as 
such.284 The court suggested that the term "initial appearance" 
under the Federal Rules refers to the first appearance of the de­
fendant before a judicial officer, whether in the arresting district or 
the charging district.285 However, the term "first appearance" 
under the Bail Reform Act refers to "the first appearance before 
any judicial officer."286 Thus, the defendant could have "as many 
'first appearances' as judicial officers his bail determination came 
before."287 
In the procedure suggested by the court in Melendez-Carrion, 
the defendant is afforded the "initial appearance" required under 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the district of arrest.288 
Then, the detention hearing is properly conducted at the "first ap­
pearance" before the judicial officer in the charging district.289 
Under the Dominguez gloss, this type of procedure is consistent 
with both the Federal Rules and the Bail Reform Act of 1984. 
281. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. See also United States v. Dominguez, 
783 F.2d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 1986) ("In some cases, ... circumstances may make it appro­
priate to request detention in the arresting district. "). 
282. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text discussing 
Federal Rule 5. 
283. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). 
284. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704 ("Although it is semantically tempting to equate 
the expressions 'initial appearance' and 'first appearance', [sic] we do not believe that 
such an interpretation is consistent with the policies behind pretrial detention or with 
the requirements for its employment under the Bail Reform Act."). 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at 705 (emphasis added). Accord United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 
1482-83 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
287. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 705. 
288. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 1986). The 
"initial appearance" constitutes the first appearance before the magistrate judge for the 
purpose of informing the defendant of certain rights and requirements-under Rule 
5(c)-and for allowing the defendant "to present locally available evidence." Id. See 
supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text discussing Federal Rule 5. 
289. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. 
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Although Melendez-Carrion involved removal of the defend­
ant from the district of arrest before the detention hearing was con­
ducted, distinguishing it from the situation in Evans ,290 the 
underlying principles of the Second Circuit's reasoning can never­
theless be applied in the Evans. context. The ·purpose of the sug­
gested initial proceeding in the district of arrest under the guidance 
of Melendez-Carrion is to assure the defendant access to vital evi­
dence only available in the district of arrest, when that coincides 
with the defendant's district of residence.291 In the situation where 
a detention hearing has occurred in the district of arrest prior to 
removal, as in Evans, the defendant's con<;:ern-as well as the dis­
sent's concern in Evans-should be alleviated.292 When removal is 
effectuated, or when review of the detention order. is ·sought in the 
charging district, a record of any pertinent evidence adduced before 
the magistrate judge in the arresting district can be provided to the 
charging district. . 
The procedure outlined iIi Melendez-Carrion conforms with 
the de novo standard of review .as well. Although true de novo 
review would require the district court to reassess the case com­
pletely anew,293 most cases that have addressed the issue of the 
proper standard of review allow the district courts a certain amount 
of discretion in the de novo assessment.294 For example, in United 
States v. Fortna,295 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit held that when the district court acts on a motion to amend 
or revoke a magistrate judge's detention order, the court acts de 
novo.296 However, the Fifth Circuit added that the district court 
could base its determination on evidence presented to the magis­
trate judge supported by additional evidence adduced before the 
district court.297 Thus, under this standard, the district court has at 
its disposal the record of the magistrate's findings-subject to in­
290. Id. at 989; United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1995). In 
Evans, the issue involved detennining the proper tribunal for review of a magistrate 
judge's detention order. Id. In Melendez-Carrion, the issue involved detennining the 
proper tribunal for the original detennination of detention or release rather than re­
view. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 984. 
291. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. 
292. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1234-35. 
293. See Baumler, supra note 63, at 503 n.213. 
294. See supra note 66 for the cases that have addressed the de novo standard of 
review. 
295. 769 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1985). 
296. Id. at 249. In addition, the court made it clear that the de novo standard 
applies as well when the government challenges a release order. Id. 
297. Id. at 249-50. 
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dependent consideration-and any additional evidence presented 
before it. 298 
De novo review of this type in a multi-district proceeding 
would doubtlessly solve the concerns that are addressed by the 
court in Melendez-Carrion, as well as the concerns addressed by the 
dissent in Evans. The district court in the charging district is the 
best forum for review because the de novo review standard allows 
for a more complete overall presentation of the pertinent evidence. 
E.Relation of Magistrate Judges to Article III Judges 
In Evans, the dissent concluded that the special relationship 
between the magistrate judge and the district court judge requires 
the detention hearing and review to be conducted in one district as 
a single package.299 In support of this position, the dissent cited to 
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Raddatz.3°O 
In Raddatz, the SupreIp.e Court stated that "Congress made 
clear [in the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act] that 
the district court has plenary discretion whether to authorize a mag­
istrate to hold an evidentiary hearing and that the magistrate acts 
subsidiary to and only in aid of the district court."301 Then, after 
author~ation,. "the entire process takes place under the district 
court's total control and jurisdiction."302 The dissent in Evans as­
serted that Raddatz stands for the proposition that the proper pro­
cedure for review is for the appeal to go from the magistrate judge 
to the district court judge in the district where the magistrate sits.303 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited 
the Raddatz language in United States v. Gebro as pertinent to the 
close relationship between the district court and the magistrate 
judge ordering release on bail.304 Although the relevant facts of 
Gebro are distinguishable from those of Evans, and the issues 
298. Id. at 250. 
299. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan, J., 
dissenting). 
300. Id. (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980». See supra notes 
150-51 and accompanying text for the facts and holding of Raddatz. 
30l. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681. 
302. Id. The dissent in Evans argued that "[t]he phrase 'total control' [used in 
Raddatz] suggests, even if it does not absolutely require, the proximity of the magistrate 
judge to the district court which is exercising control." Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, 
J., dissenting). 
303. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
304. United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 1991). See supra notes 
154-56 and accompanying text for the facts and holding of Gebro. 
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raised in the cases are different,3°5 the Evans dissent considered 
Gebro the "closest precedent" for the Ninth Circuit.306 
The Gebro court also relied on an Eighth Circuit court of ap­
peals case, United States v. Maull. 307 In Maull, the Eighth Circuit, 
in a situation similar to that in Gebro, held that the district court 
did not exceed its authority by conducting sua sponte a detention 
hearing and ordering the defendant detained.308 The court held 
that "[w]e ... cannot conclude that the government's failure to re­
quest detention before the magistrate, or for that matter at all, con­
strains the district court judge."309 The court in Maull determined 
that the role of the magistrate judge is a limited one, and that there 
is a certain territorial hierarchy to proceedings involving a magis­
trate judge and the Article III court.310 
305. The facts of Gebro and Evans differ in that the defendant in Gebro was 
arrested in the district of prosecution, thus involving a single district proceeding. 
Gebro, 948 F.2d at 1119-20. The facts of Gebro gave rise to an issue of whether the 
district court judge could review sua sponte the magistrate judge's order. Id. at 1120. 
Conversely, the defendant in Evans was arrested in a non-charging district, giving rise 
to an issue of the proper procedure to follow in a multi-district proceeding. Evans, 62 
F.3d at 1234-35. 
306. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
307. 773 F.2d 1479 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). In Maull, the defendant was in­
dicted and arrested in the Eastern District of Missouri. Id. at 1481. A federal magis­
trate judge set the defendant's bond at one million dollars. Id. Neither the government 
nor the magistrate judge moved for pretrial detention. United States v. Maull, 768 F.2d 
211, 212 (8th Cir. 1985). The defendant sought review of the conditions of the bond in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Maull, 773 F.2d at 
1481. The district court judge held sua sponte a detention hearing and ordered the 
defendant detained. Id. 
The defendant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court "exceeded the 
scope of its authority because the Bail Reform Act of 1984 does not confer jurisdiction 
on the district court to go beyond review of the conditions of a bail bond to consider 
whether pretrial detention is appropriate." Id. The appellate court held that the dis­
trict court had no authority to conduct a detention hearing and reversed and remanded 
the district court's order. Id. On remand, the district court ordered the defendant re­
leased on a $500,000 appearance bond secured by $250,000 cash or surety. Maull, 768 
F.2d at 211. 
The defendant again appealed to the Eighth Circuit for an amendment of the con­
ditions of release. Id. The court of appeals remanded the district court's order with 
directions. Id. at 212. The Eighth Circuit later granted a rehearing en banc and af­
firmed the district court's original order of detention of the defendant. United States v. 
Maull, 771 F.2d 506 (8th CiT. 1985) (en banc). 
308. Maull, 773 F.2d at 1481. 
309. Id. at 1486. 
310. See id. The Eighth Circuit stated: 
Congressional intent to limit the scope of magistrate authority is reinforced by 
the charge of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), which gives the judicial officer upon his own 
motion the authority to call a detention hearing where there is a serious risk 
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Under the auspices of Raddatz and its progeny, the dissent in 
Evans argued that the magistrate judge and Article III courts have 
a hierarchical relationship.311 The dissent asserted that this rela­
tionship lends support to the conclusion that the proper court to 
review the magistrate judge's order of detention or release is the 
district court in the arresting district. 312 
Raddatz, Gebro, and Maull support the proposition that the 
magistrate judge's role is limited by the district court which ap­
points the magistrate-but only in the single-district case.313 There 
is nothing to suggest that this "territorial hierarchy" approach is 
supported by any of these cases in the multi-district context. The 
Evans dissent indicated this by acknowledging that Gebro was the 
"closest precedent" to the principal case.314 It is manifest that in a 
single-district situation the district court in the arresting district will 
have "control" over the magistrate judge.315 But in the multi-dis­
that the defendant will flee. The power to decide must finally reside in the 
Article III court. 
Id. 
311. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan, J., 
dissenting). 
312. Id. In Evans, the dissent argued that the logical steps in "territorial appel­
late review" start at the level of the federal magistrate judge in the district of arrest. Id. 
Review then proceeds to the district court judge in the district in which the magistrate 
sits, and then to the appellate court of the circuit in which the magistrate judge and 
district court are assembled. Id. The dissent asserted that this is the "normal system of 
appellate review," and that this view is consistent with the holdings in Raddatz and 
Gebro. Id. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980); United States v. 
Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 1991). 
313. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681; Gebro, 948 F.2d at 1120; Maull, 773 F.2d at 1486. 
Under the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.c. §§ 631-639 
(1994), "Congress expanded the role of magistrates under the discretion and direction 
of district court judges." Raymond P. Bolanos, Note, Magistrates and Felony Voir Dire: 
A Threat to Fundamental Fairness?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 827, 840 (1989). See H.R. REP. 
No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6162. See 
also J. Anthony Downs, Comment, The Boundaries of Article Ill: Delegation of Final 
Decisionmaking Authority to Magistrates, 52 U. On. L. REV. 1032,1032 (1985) ("Con­
gress expressly granted magistrates the power, upon deSignation by the district 
court ... , to conduct 'any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter' as well as 
criminal misdemeanor trials."); Philip M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Pro­
gress: The Evolution and Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 
AM. U. L. REv. 1503, 1510 (1995) ("A magistrate judge is a judicial officer of the dis­
trict court. The district judges appoint magistrate judges within the district ...."). 
314. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting). The dissent acknowledged 
that Gebro was the "closest precedent" because it is substantially factually different and 
addresses separate issues than does Evans. See supra note 305 and accompanying text 
discussing the distinctions between the two cases. 
315. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681 ("entire process takes place under district court's 
total control and jurisdiction"). 
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trict situation, this element of control is not as evident. In United 
States v. Zuccaro,316 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, in a single district bail amendment situation, held 
that the district court had the authority to amend a bail order issued 
by the magistrate judge.317 The court partially based its decision on 
the desire to avoid the' anomalous results that would arise in a 
multi-district situation under Rule 40 of the Federal'Rules of Crimi­
nal Procedure.31B The court stated that when the defendant is re­
moved to the charging district pursuant to Rule 40, "it would not 
make sense to insist that the government's only recourse in seeking 
additional conditions of bail is to apply to the judicial officer who 
originally set the conditions."319 The court further stated that "the 
category of judicial officers authorized to set the initial conditions 
of bail covers a broad range of officials . . .. Congress would not 
likely have accorded these officers authority to set conditions of re­
lease immune from revision by a district judge."32o This approach 
was adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev­
enth321 and Eighth Circuits,322 both involving actual multi-district 
situations. This line of cases illustrates the limited role of the ar­
resting district magistrate judge in the multi-district setting. Addi­
tionally, the cases show that the district court in the charging district 
has control over the magistrate judge, similar to the control as­
sumed by the district court in the arresting district. 
Under the "territorial hierarchy" notion suggested by the dis­
sent in Evans, one would expect that in all cases the district court 
would take over the proceedings conducted by the magistrate judge 
in the same district. However, it is quite clear that this is' not so in 
the multi-district context for several reasons. First, in the multi-dis­
trict context, the court with original jurisdiction over the offense is 
the district court in the charging district.323 Under the language of 
316. 645 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981). Zuc­
caro involved a magistrate judge and a district judge in the same district. The defend­
ant was arrested and brought before a federal magistrate judge who released the 
defendant on bond. Id. at 105. The next day the government filed a motion with the 
district court to increase the bond, and the district court did so. Id. The defendant 
appealed, arguing that under 18 U.S.c. § 3146(e) (repealed 1984) the district court 
could not amend the bail. Id. See 18 U.S.c. § 3146(e) (1982) (repealed 1984). 
317. Zuccaro,645 F.2d at 105-06. 
318. Id. at 106. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. 
321. United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886, 889-90 (11th Cir. 1982). 
322. United States v. Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808, 813-14 (8th Cir. 1986). 
323. See discussion supra part III.B. See also Spilotro, 786 F.2d at 813 ("the mag­
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section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act, that is the proper district for 
review.324 Second, under Rule 4O(a) of the Federal Rules of Crimi­
nal Procedure, the charging district must take over the case if the 
defendant is required to stand trial.325 Finally, venue properly lies 
solely in the district in which the crime was committed.326 These 
principles disrupt the "territorial hierarchy" notion and indicate 
that in a multi-district proceeding the "control" over the magistrate 
judge remains generally with the .district court in the charging 
district. 
Finally, the de novo review standard accorded to the district 
courts in review of the magistrate judge supports the conclusion 
that a departure from "territorial hierarchy" would not be problem­
atic. In fact, the development in the case law of the many different 
intricacies within the de novo standard suggests that this divergence 
is preferred.327 Because the district courts need not be deferential 
to the magistrate judge, there is no justification for adherence to the 
. rigid notion of "territorial hierarchy." 
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE INTERPRETIVE CONFLICT 
To resolve the conflict arising in Evans over the proper inter­
pretation of section :"145 of the Bail Reform Act, there must be an 
accommodation between the views. Legislative intent in the draft­
ing of section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is lacking-it 
seems that Congress never even gave consideration to the problems 
that may arise in the multi-district context.328 Congress left it to the 
judiciary to determine which is "the court having original jurisdic­
tion over the offense" as it is worded in section 3145.329 The ap­
istrate ... of the court which has original jurisdiction over the offense charged [the 
district court in the charging district] has the authority to amend conditions of release 
previously set in another district by another magistrate"); James, 674 F.2d at 890 (dis­
trict judge in charging district "had authority as the court with original jurisdiction over 
the case to amend the conditions of appellants' release"); Zuccaro, 645 F.2d at 105 
(referring to district court in the charging district as the court with original jurisdiction 
over the offense). 
324. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1994) (government or defendant may file with the 
court having original jurisdiction over the offense a motion for revocation of the order 
or amendment of the conditions). 
325. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). 
326. See discussion supra part I.C. 
327. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text discussing the de novo stan­
dard of review and its variations. 
328. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text discussing the lack of consid­
eration by Congress of the problems arising in the multi-district situation. 
329. St!e generally 18 V.S.C. § 3145 (1994). 
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proach best able to integrate the applicable provisions of the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
the United States Constitution into a consistent model for multi­
district proceedings is the approach suggested by the majority and 
concurrence in Evans.330 Under that approach, the proper tribunal 
to review a magistrate judge's orders in the multi-district context is 
the district court in the charging district. 
The best way to analyze the conclusions of the majority and 
concurring opinions in Evans is to view them in contemplation of 
the major concerns involved in the underlying issue, as best re­
flected in Melendez-Carrion.331 The court in Melendez-Carrion 
concluded that the district of prosecution was normally the best dis­
trict in which to assess the defendant for the purpose of determin­
ing detention or release.332 But the court argued that it is important 
to give the defendant the opportunity to "present locally available 
evidence pertinent to the issue of pretrial release."333 
Following this rationale, the Evans-type situation is analogous 
to the Melendez-Carrion-type situation.334 The Second Circuit de­
termined that a defendant in a Melendez-Carrion-type situation can 
be protected by being afforded an initial proceeding in which to 
obtain evidence that may only be reasonably obtainable in the dis­
330. There are many concerns involved in coming to a conclusion regarding the 
proper interpretation of § 3145. They include: (1) compliance with the prompt appear­
ance requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 40 and 5, see FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 40 and 5; (2) concern for providing the defendant prompt review, see FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 40(a); United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wallace, c.J., con­
curring); (3) concern for providing the defendant access to the decisive information and 
evidence, see United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 1986); (4) 
determining the proper court to handle a personal, knowledgeable assessment of the 
defendant, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1994); Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, c.J., con­
curring); Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990; United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 
704-05 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Velasco, 879 F. Supp. 377, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); 
United States v. Johnson, 858 F. Supp. 119, 122 (N.D. Ind. 1994); United States v. Jones, 
804 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (S.D. Ind. 1992); United States v. Acheson, 672 F. Supp. 577, 
579 (D.N.H. 1987); (5) compliance with constitutional rights, see U.S. CONST. art III, 
§ 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; and (6) consistency among statutory sections, Federal 
Rules, and the Constitution. 
331. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. See supra notes 276-92 and accompany­
ing text discussing Melendez-Carrion. 
332. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. 
333. Id. 
334. Recall that Evans involved a determination of the proper court to review the 
order of the magistrate. See Evans, 62 F.3d at 1234. In Melendez-Carrion, the situation 
involved a question of whether removal proceedings should precede the detention hear­
ing. See Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. The cases are analogous, however, in that 
both involve the underlying concern of determining which court is best able to assess 
the defendant under § 3142 of the Bail Reform Act. 
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trict of arrest.335 Although Melendez-Carrion is distinguishable 
from Evans in that it would afford protection in a removal proceed­
ing rather than a review proceeding, the underlying purpose-to 
give the defendant the opportunity to obtain critical evidence or 
information in the district of residence-applies equally in the Ev­
ans context. 
Thus, the concern in interpreting section 3145 to afford the de­
fendant protection from inaccessibility to local evidence in the Ev­
ans-type situation is allayed.336 The defendant in Evans had 
already been given the opportunity to present the local evidence 
because the detention hearing actually took place in the district of 
arrest.337 That is analogous to affording the defendant in a 
Melendez-Carrion-type situation an opportunity to present the lo­
cal evidence in a proceeding prior to removal. 
Moreover, this approach promotes consistency between the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984 and the underlying purposes of the con­
stitutional guarantee of trial in the district wherein the crime is 
alleged to have been committed.338 The hallmark of the constitu­
tional venue provisions is the facilitation of factfinding.339 Author­
izing de novo review in the district court in the charging district 
advances this objective. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments supporting the "district of prosecution" per­
spective have a strong foundation in the case law and are bolstered 
by viewing them in light of various sections of the Bail Reform Act 
of 1984. Moreover, this view reads consistently with Rule 40 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the United States Consti­
tution. In view of this persuasive support, it is most reasonable to 
interpret section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 as requiring 
review of the magistrate judge's order of detention or release in the 
district court in which prosecution is pending. 
335. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. This initial proceeding to which the 
Melendez-Carrion court refers is not a detention hearing. It is a proceeding designed to 
give the defendant an opportunity to present the local evidence to the magistrate judge 
in the local district. See id. The purpose of the local proceeding is "so that a transcript 
of such .evidence can be prepared and furnished to the [magistrate judge] making the 
detention decision in the district of prosecution." Id. 
336. See Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
337. Id. at 1234-35. 
338. See discussion supra part I.e. 
339. Note, supra note 72, at 107-08. See supra note 73. 
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A plain reading of section 3145 in light of the influence of Arti­
cle III, Section 2, Clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution supports this interpretation. In the phrase "the 
court having original jurisdiction over the offense," the word "the" 
is important in limiting the court with "original jurisdiction" to a 
particular court.340 And an analysis of Article III, Section 2, Clause 
3 and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution reveals that a de­
fendant is afforded a constitutional right to be tried in the district 
where the crimes are alleged to have been committed.341 
Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also fac­
tors into the inquiry. Absent a waiver, the defendant will be re­
quired, under Rule 40(a), to stand trial in the prosecuting district.342 
Moreover, under Rule 40(c), papers generated in the pretrial deten­
tion proceedings and any bail collected in the district of arrest are 
required to be transferred to the charging district upon a determi­
nation of detention or release, properly contemplating removal to 
that district.343 
Finally, the factors that the magistrate judge must consider in 
making the determination of detention or release are best reas­
sessed on review by the district court in: the district of prosecu­
tion.344 The charging district will normally have the requisite 
familiarity with the nature and circumstances of the offense 
charged.345 Any concerns regarding inaccessibility to local evi­
dence are alleviated by the flexibility of the de novo review 
standard. 
Because the functions and objectives of the Bail Reform Act 
overlap with other important authorities, primarily the United 
States Constitution and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
development of consistency among these authorities is crucial. The 
reasons for the development of consistency are threefold: (1) to 
protect the rights of the accused; (2) to preserve the safety of the 
community; and (3) to promote the expediency of the criminal pro­
cess. By concluding that the authority to review a federal magis­
trate judge's order, pursuant to section 3145 of the Bail Reform 
340. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1994) (emphasis added). 
341. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cI. 3 ("1i"ial shall be held in the State where the 
... Crimes shall have been committed"); U.S. CONST. amend VI ("right to ... trial[ ] by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed"). . 
342. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). 
343. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(c). 
344. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1994). 
345. § 3142(g)(1). 
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Act, lies solely with the charging district, the Evans court fomlU­
lated a logical and consistent model of criminal pretrial proce­
dure-indeed, an apropos solution to the question of the proper 
interpretation of section 3145. As the framework of this Note dem­
onstrates, adherence to,the notion of criminal pretrial consistency 
among the relevant authorities in fact ultimately dictates such a 
conclusion. 
Scott C. Wells 
